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# PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL)

## FAR EAST

(1 OCTOBER 1959-31 JANUARY 1960)

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

PRL (Guide No. 164)  
Far East  
October 1959-January 1960

FOREWORD

1. CIA Periodic Requirements Lists (PRL's), which are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in CIA, are designed to point up the information required for current intelligence coverage of significant developments during the 4-month time period covered by each PRL.

2. Coordination with the Department of State includes the PRL's for all the world areas: (a) the USSR, (b) Eastern Europe, (c) Western Europe, (d) Near East/Africa, (e) Far East and (f) Latin America. As a result, the PRL's include current intelligence requirements from the Intelligence and Regional Bureaus of the State Department, as well as those from the CIA Offices of Current Intelligence (OCI), Research and Reports (ORR) and Scientific Intelligence (OSI). In addition, the PRL's include major intelligence deficiencies noted in the Post-Mortems of appropriate National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) approved by the US Intelligence Board (USIB)--the principal governing body for US intelligence, comprised of the heads of all US intelligence agencies under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

3. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Lists may, in total, present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any single collection facility. However, to the extent that the collector has a capability, it is hoped that these PRL's will provide effective guidance for current intelligence reporting. For those collectors who may not have access to background information, explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of the requirements.

4. To facilitate and possibly expand the use of the PRL, all items contained herein have been classified separately and bear one of the following classifications: SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN (S/NOFORN), CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN), OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO), and UNCLASSIFIED (U).

5. Comments on the PRL's are encouraged and should be directed to:

a. Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA, Room 2019 Que Building, Code 163, Extension 2181;

or b. Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and Distribution (ICD), Department of State.

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Acting Chief, Requirements Branch,  
OCI/CIA

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(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

BURMA

The Ne Win regime has announced to Parliament that elections will be held in the last week of January or the first week of February 1960. There is every indication that the elections will be held on schedule and that the army and Ne Win plan to exercise behind-the-scenes control over a parliamentary government formed by the Ba Swe-Kyaw Nyein faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, the expected winner of the elections. Of prime interest, therefore, during the next four months will be the election campaign, particularly information suggesting the probable outcome of the elections. Also of importance will be information on the impact of the Laotian crisis, the Sino-Indian border clashes, and the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchanges on the direction of Burmese foreign policy.

A. Political - Internal

1. Ne Win's intentions: As the increasingly unquestioned boss of Burma's military establishment, the intentions of General Ne Win continue to be of prime importance. Of interest will be information on the degree to which Ne Win will permit the army to rig the elections in favor of the Ba Swe-Kyaw Nyein faction; the criteria by which he will judge the performance of the expected Ba Swe government in the light of his reported promise to permit the military to resume control should Ba Swe founder; the degree to which he will personally interest himself in governmental affairs once he steps down as premier; and his sympathies as regards the various political parties. Information on his attitude toward the US in general and toward US military forces and military policy in particular, is desired. (C)

2. Relationship between Ne Win and the "political colonels": Any evidence of serious divergency of views or goals? Any evidence the "political colonels" intend to leave the army to pursue openly political careers at the head of an army-favored party? (C)

3. Relationships among political leaders: Relationships between U Nu and Ba Swe. Relationships between U Nu and Kyaw Nyein. Relationships between Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein. Relationships between Ne Win and each of the forementioned leaders. Possibility of reconciliation among foregoing three leaders or between U Nu and either of the other two. Attitude and intentions of Dr. E. Maung. Transfers



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BURMA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

of allegiance by major politicians from one AFPFL faction to the other. Names and attitudes of second echelon leaders who gave promise of rising in the hierarchy of the two factions. Factional leaders of politically significant groups, such as ethnic minorities and labor unions. (C)

4. Political Groups: The regional and local membership strength and degree of popular support for the two AFPFL factions and the above-ground Communist elements. Description of the internal organization of the two AFPFL factions and the NUF on the central, regional and local levels. (C)

5. Communists: Over-all strategic plans of Communists in Burma. Evidence of emphasis upon above-ground voting and propaganda tactics or upon underground military insurgent tactics. Direct linkings between underground Communists and above-ground Communist and pro-Communist political groups. Evidence of friction between underground and above-ground. Communist plans to infiltrate either AFPFL faction. Evidence of direct relationship between either above-ground or under-ground Communists and Soviet or CPR diplomatic missions. Evaluation concerning relative influence of Soviet or CPR mission in such tactics. Biographic information concerning Communist and Communist-front leaders. (C)

6. Minority Groups: Attitudes and intentions of minority groups in political operations. Degree of Army influence upon minority groups. Indications of dissatisfaction among minority groups which could lead to secession or insurgency. Evidence of collaboration among minority groups in combined opposition to central government. Bargaining tactics and objectives of minority groups in dealings with opposing AFPFL factions. Degree of popular support for various political factions purporting to represent minority groups. Evidence of relationships between minority groups and Communists or Communist-front organizations. Evidence of relationships between minority groups (political and insurgent) and foreign agents. Identity and geographic information concerning foreign agents working with, or in close contact with, minority groups. Prospects for a negotiated settlement of the Karen rebellion. Information on the Shan dissident group said to be operating in Kengtung State. (C)

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BURMA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

7. Pacification: Ability of military establishment to suppress armed insurrection. Pressures upon government to ameliorate anti-insurgent policy. Source of such pressures. Counter pressures to maintain firm anti-insurgent policy. Source of counter pressures. Effectiveness of psychological warfare activities. Indoctrination of and control over insurgent groups after their surrender. Evidence that surrendering insurgents are using "Trojan Horse" tactics for subversive infiltrations. (C)

8. Chinese Nationalist Guerrillas: Strength, disposition, and activity. Evidence of continued support from Taipei, Thailand, or elsewhere. Degree of GRC control over their activities. Recruiting activity among refugee tribesmen in border area. Evidence of collaboration with other non-Communist insurgent groups. Relationships between Nationalists and Burmese military authorities. Smuggling, banditry, and narcotics operations. Collaboration with authorities or other elements in Thailand and Laos. (C)

9. Chinese Community: General evaluation of political attitude. Chinese Communist activity. KMT activity. Non-Communist but non-KMT activity. Loan operations of Chinese Communist banks. Influence and channels of influence of CPR Embassy. CPR pressure on Burmese authorities with respect to Chinese community. Restrictions placed by GUB on anti-Communist organizations and activities within the Chinese community. Efforts to GUB to control illicit immigration from across China border. (C)

10. Labor: Impact of political split upon Burma trade union movement. Degree of factionalization and relative strengths of emerging unions in support of both AFPFL factions or professing to be politically independent. Evidence of Communist infiltrations in trade union movement. Tendencies towards violence in attaining trade union objectives. Current ideological and political trends as they may affect relations with either ICFTU or WFTU. (C)

11. Police: Nature, degree, and effect of Army control over police force. General orientation of senior police officials. Relationship between police and political groups. Police attitudes toward assistance received from US; police attitudes toward assistance received from UK. (C)

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BURMA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

12. Students: Political activity by students. Communist infiltration of university faculties and higher educational institutions. Student training in Russia or European Satellites. Student training in CPR. Government efforts to control Communist activity among students. Effectiveness of US student exchange and Fulbright programs. (C)

13. Religious Groups: To what extent have the local Communists penetrated religious organizations, particularly the Buddhist clergy? What means have they used, how effective has the penetration been, and what are the outward manifestations of this penetration, if any, within each country? What is the Communist influence in the Islamic, Hindu and Christian communities? How is it exercised, and how is it manifested? (C)

B. Foreign Affairs

1. Effects of the border dispute and other sources of friction between Burma and Sino-Soviet Bloc, as well as of the recent Tibetan crisis, on relative bias of Burma's neutral foreign policy. (C)

2. Burmese attitude toward association with neighboring countries in regional organizations, especially SEATO. (C)

3. Burma's attitude toward the conflict between the Arab world and the West.

a. Between the Arab world and Isarel. (C)

4. Indications of attempts by Burma to help other neutralist states in Southeast Asia--like Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia--to profit by the lessons it has learned in its relations with China. (C)

5. Burma's policy toward the two Vietnams. Any indications of a trend toward closer relations with South Vietnam. (C)

6. Burma's attitude toward another Asian-African conference. (C)

a. Any indications it is prepared to suggest an early meeting. (C)

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BURMA (Continued)

B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)

7. Information on attitudes of the Ne Win government toward US military and economic assistance. (C)

8. Burma's reactions to growing Communist strength in Laos. (C)

9. Relations between:

a. Burma and India. (C)

b. Burma and Japan. (C)

c. Burma and UK. (C)

d. Burma and Pakistan. (C)

C. Economic

1. Progress in economic development plans. Impact of army regime on scope, content and direction of development. (C)

2. Degree of foreign participation (i.e., Japan, UK, Communist countries, and international agencies) in Burmese economic development. (C)

3. Evaluation of Sino-Soviet economic aid and technical assistance to Burma, including information concerning the negotiation, initiation, and progress of specific economic projects by Bloc countries, the financing of such projects, and technicians engaged in their implementation. (C)

4. Pressures which might force the Burmese toward closer economic ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc. (C)

5. Dumping of capital or consumer goods by Sino-Soviet Bloc. (C)

6. Terms of credit provided by Sino-Soviet trading entities in trade and commercial transactions. (C)

7. Any information on the activities of Chinese Communist banks in Burma. (C)

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BURMA (Continued)

D. Soviet Bloc Medical Assistance

The USSR will build and equip a 200-bed hospital among other projects, as a gift in exchange for a gift of corresponding quantity of rice. Construction has begun on the hospital. (U)

1. Have other Soviet contributions or medical aid been presented to Burma? (C)

2. How is Soviet or Satellite medical aid propagandized? How effective is the propaganda? (C)

3. Any medical facilities, equipment, and supplies recently provided? (C)

4. What Soviet or Satellite medical personnel have been in Burma recently? (C)

5. What Burmese medical personnel have recently visited the USSR or Satellites? Have Burmese received medical training or treatment in the USSR or Satellites? (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

CAMBODIA

A. Political

1. The latest pro-Western swing in Cambodia's pendulum-like neutrality policy under the leadership of Crown Prince Sihanouk, may take on more significance than have previous such moves. Sihanouk, already shaken by Communist Chinese repression in Tibet, is seriously concerned over the Communist insurgency in neighboring Laos; India's border troubles with Communist China is an additional factor. While these developments thus far have not dislodged Sihanouk's official subscription to a policy of neutrality, there are indications he is beginning to take a more realistic attitude toward the danger of Communist subversion. Continuing information is needed on Sihanouk's foreign policy views and his attitudes toward the Free World, Sino-Soviet and neutral blocs. Information concerning domestic actions taken by Sihanouk which might either encourage or discourage Communist influence in Cambodia is of particular importance. Information on the views of influential Cambodians on this overall subject is desired, particularly any signs of dissatisfaction with the government's neutrality policy and accommodation with the Communist bloc. (C)

2. Information on general security conditions throughout Cambodia, particularly in the Laotian and South Vietnamese border regions. Is there any evidence of clandestine Vietnamese Communist activity in these border areas? (C)

3. Cambodian - South Vietnamese relations have improved following Sihanouk's visit to Saigon in early August, but many obstacles remain to real rapport. Information on ensuing negotiations between the two countries on mutual problems such as border security, financial settlement, etc is desired. Any indication that relations may again become strained. (C)

4. Information on the identity, loyalty, orientation and influence of Sihanouk's close advisors - Cambodian and French. Any indication of dissatisfaction on the part of political and military leaders with Sihanouk's leadership and policies. Evidence of residual sympathy for the anti-Sihanouk stand taken by the late General Dap Chhuon. What is the extent and impact of anti-Sihanouk propaganda issued by expatriates Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh via pamphlets, clandestine "Radio Free Cambodia," or other means? Any evidence of South Vietnamese or Thai support of anti-Sihanouk elements inside or outside of Cambodia. (S)

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CAMBODIA (Continued)

A. Political

5. What is the nature and extent of Communist influence in the Cambodian Information Ministry? Has the newly-created committee to supervise publications, headed by Deputy Premier Nhiek Tiouloung, been effective in curtailing Communist influence in the nation's press and other information media? Indicate dominant personnel of the Ministry of Information, their affiliations and degree of independent initiative. Information is desired on Communist efforts and success at infiltrating other parts of the government, the armed forces, youth and religious groups. (S)

6. What is the nature and effectiveness of Sino-Soviet bloc propaganda efforts in Cambodia? In this connection, information is desired on Chinese Communist aid to Cambodia in the field of radio broadcasting, including such details as Chinese radio technicians sent to Cambodia and training of Cambodians in China. (C)

7. Vietnamese Communist clandestine activities, organization and strength in Cambodia. Is there any evidence of Communist employment of dissident Vietnamese elements residing in Cambodia for activities directed against the Diem government in South Vietnam? Any evidence that Vietnamese Communists are recruiting racial Cambodians residing in South Vietnam for their subversive organization in Cambodia? (C)

8. Political attitudes and activities of Cambodia's Overseas Chinese and Vietnamese communities. (C)

a. Information on efforts by Peiping, Hanoi, Taipei and Saigon to advance their respective interests in these groups. (C)

b. Activities of anti-Diem groups in Cambodia. (C)

c. What organizations or institutions have been developed in the Chinese community--either by the Cambodian government or the Chinese themselves--to discharge the administrative functions formerly handled by the congregation system? Information is desired on Communist activities in this connection. (C)

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CAMBODIA (Continued)

A. Political (Continued)

9. Stability in Cambodia is hampered by the considerable dissension which exists within the government and within the ruling Sangkum party. Any faltering in the governmental machinery is injurious to Cambodia's efforts to effect a viable neutrality in the face of Communist propaganda and subversion. (C)

a. Indications of friction between the national assembly and the executive branch. (C)

b. Indications of friction between old-time members of the Sangkum and the newer "converts," particularly from the Communist Pracheachon party. (C)

c. Information on the various political cliques in the government, and the behind-the-scenes role played by the Royal Palace in Cambodian politics. (C)

10. Application of Sihanouk's "Khmer Socialism" designed to reduce class distinctions in Cambodia. (C)

a. Information on Sihanouk's campaign to dignify manual labor. Attitude of officials and of the public toward new regulations requiring civil servants and students to engage in agricultural or industrial activities for set periods each year. (C)

11. Current strength and activities of non-Sangkum parties, especially the Democratic and Communist Pracheachon organizations. (C)

a. Pracheachon party connections with Communist bloc representatives in Cambodia. (C)

b. Information on Son Ngoc Thanh's activities and his connections with the Democratic party. (C)

c. How successful have been Pracheachon efforts to infiltrate the Sangkum? (C)

12. In regard to religion and religious groups: (C)

a. What evidence is there that religion per se acts as an obstacle to the spread of Communism or, on the other hand, that it serves as a vehicle for the spread of Communism? (C)



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CAMBODIA (Continued)

A. Political (Continued)

12. b. Repercussions among Cambodian Buddhist groups of Chinese Communist repression in Tibet, including any indication of dissatisfaction with the government's policy of close friendship toward Peiping. (C)

13. Current organization, effectiveness, and loyalty of potentially important Cambodian associations, such as the Royal Khmer Socialist Youth and the General Association of Civil Servants. (C)

14. What is the nature and extent of anti-American sentiment in Cambodia? (C)

B. Military

1. Sihanouk has spoken of the need to retrench the Cambodian army, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare training and a trained reserve. Information on possible implementation of this policy is desired. (C)

2. Any indication of Cambodia turning to the Communist bloc for military aid. (C)

3. Attitude of the Cambodian military toward US MAAG. (C)

4. Current organization and effectiveness of the Cambodian armed forces, police and other para-military organizations. The patterns of loyalty in the Cambodian Army and the nature of political involvement of its officers. (C)

C. Foreign Affairs

1. Expansion of Cambodian political contacts with other nations, particularly Communist bloc nations. (C)

2. Information on all aspects of Cambodia's relations with South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. (C)

3. Developments in Cambodian-French political, military and cultural relations. Information on the political attitudes, activities and influence of French representatives in Cambodia. (C)

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CAMBODIA (Continued)

D. Economic

1. Implementation of Chinese Communist and other bloc economic and technical aid programs in Cambodia, e.g., types of projects undertaken, number of technicians being sent to Cambodia, progress of projects, local reactions to the programs, etc. (C)
2. Details of Cambodian trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc and the effects of this trade on Cambodia's traditional economic relations with the West. (C)
3. Information on Cambodia's five-year economic development plan. (C)
4. Cambodia's economic plans for use of the new deep-water port at Sihanoukville and connecting road to Phnom Pehh. (C)
5. Indications of Cambodia entering into an air agreement with Communist China. (C)

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(1 October 1959-31 January 1960)

COMMUNIST CHINA

A. Political - Internal

The domestic scene in China has been dominated by a long period of reassessment of the "giant leap forward" and the communes, and a serious reduction in the scope of these programs. In the field of foreign relations the Peiping regime hopes to continue the support received from the Soviet Bloc--especially from the USSR--and to attain wider diplomatic recognition, membership in the UN, and the annexation of Taiwan. (C) We are interested in:

1. All information about the revised "leap forward" and commune programs; the campaign against "rightist opportunism;" the existence of cliques within the CCP favoring a harsh or moderate economic policy. (C)

2. Sessions of the Party Congress, Central Committee, Politburo, or Standing Committee. (C)

3. Prominence or lapse into obscurity, of: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ch'en Yun, and other prominent members of the CCP politburo and CC. (C)

4. Any recent changes in government and party personnel at the national, provincial and local levels. (U)

5. Indications of organized or unorganized popular resistance to the Peiping regime. Evidence of peasant unrest and unrest among minority groups throughout China. (C)

6. Information on expression of resentment, particularly among the intelligentsia, against thought control and lack of academic freedom in Communist China. (C)

7. Current data on education and literacy, including progress in literacy drives, shifts in educational policies, expansion of facilities and enrollments, quality of technical educations and scientific research activities. (C)

8. Attitude toward Nationalist China of disaffected persons and groups in Communist China. (C)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

9. Any evidence of the effect, if any, of Chinese Nationalist propaganda on the mainland? (C)

10. Intensification or initiation of large scale propaganda campaigns. (C)

B. Foreign Affairs

1. Evidence of Chinese Communist efforts to subvert the Chinese Nationalist Government or to negotiate with the Nationalists for the "liberation" of Taiwan or to induce individual defections. (C)

2. Any recent changes in propaganda treatment of US? (U)

a. Chinese Communist views on Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. (U)

3. Data revealing the depth of Communist China's identification with the world Communist movement and its disposition to follow orthodox Communist doctrine as opposed to a more "Chinese" way of doing things. (C)

a. Claims of theoretical originality for Mao Tse-tung.

b. Views on "peaceful competition" with US and on "relaxation of tensions" between East and West "camps."

4. Current Sino-Soviet relations and activities. (C)

a. Evidences of unity of purpose in world and Communist Bloc affairs. (C)

b. Possible areas of friction. (C)

c. Chinese views on Soviet relations with the US-- particularly in regard to summit talks and Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange. (C)

5. Chinese Communist efforts to make diplomatic, economic and subversive penetrations in: (C)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)

5. a. South and Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia, Japan and Korea. (C)

b. The Middle East and Africa. (C)

c. Latin America. (C)

6. Extent of Chinese Communist influence on other Communist parties. (C)

a. Latin America. (C)

b. South and Southeast Asia. (C)

c. Soviet satellites. (C)

d. USA. (C)

7. Indications of Communist intentions regarding Japan, including "people's diplomacy," resumption of talks relating to trade, or other issues. (C)

a. Use of Sohyo and Japanese Communist Party in anti-Kishi and anti-US efforts. (C)

8. Chinese Communist intentions in regard to Hong Kong and Macao. (C)

a. Efforts to force local fishermen into Communes. (C)

b. Other moves to harass the Hong Kong and Macao Government. (C)

9. Chinese Communists attitude toward South Asia--particularly India--and Southeast Asia--particularly Burma and Malaya-Singapore. (C)

a. Border negotiations with neighboring states. (C)

b. Border violations by Chinese Communist troops. (C)

c. Evidence of any change in Peiping's view of the uncommitted countries. (C)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)

10. Peiping's attitude towards Laos, particularly any evidence that it will covertly supply Communist forces inside the country. (C)

11. Any evidence of expanded Chinese Communist activity in the Paracels. (C)

12. Efforts to stem refugee flow. (C)

C. Military

1. Evidence--negative as well as positive--of specific Sino-Soviet agreements on Soviet commitments to China's defense in event of expanded hostilities--particularly in regard to the Taiwan Straits area. (S)

2. What is the extent of Soviet participation in Chinese military affairs and operations particularly near the Taiwan Straits area? (C)

a. Supply of various types of aircraft, naval vessels, and weapons. (C)

3. Condition of airfields and reports of new airfield construction. (C)

4. Any new evidence in regard to Chinese Communist plans or intentions concerning Taiwan and the off-shore islands. (C)

a. Duration of shelling of Quemoy complex? (C)

5. Introduction of new equipment of all types, particularly missiles of any type. (C)

6. Evidence of CW and BW activity and doctrine. (C)

7. An expanded militia is reportedly one of the features of the new communes that are being organized in rural areas. How are these units formed? What is their relationship to the regular military services of the country? What part do they play in internal security? How are they armed and equipped? (S)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

C. Military (Continued)

8. Any evidence of friction between army and people, army and party and among elements within the army? (C)

9. Peiping's view of nuclear weapons, including the nature of any discussions, agreements or understandings with the USSR. Chinese Communist attitude towards test suspensions.

10. Chinese Communist attitude towards international discussions of disarmament.

11. Evidence of any shift away from emphasis on Soviet military doctrine in favor of a "revolutionary" strategy more in keeping with Communist China's military history.

12. Morale of Chinese troops. (C)

13. Personnel shifts in the high command, with appropriate biographic information where available. (C)

14. Any information of military production, including the manufacture of arms, ammunition and military equipment. (C)

15. Battle tactics of all components. (C)

D. Scientific

1. Biology

a. Because of the importance of the food situation to Communist China, it has become increasingly necessary to follow developments in the supporting biological and agricultural sciences of China. Thus, information is needed on which to base estimates as to quality, status of, and trends in the biological and agricultural research and as to the impact such research will have on Chinese food potential. (C)

(1) Identification and bibliographic information of biological and agricultural research personnel. (U)

(2) Identification of biological and agricultural research institutes and facilities. (U)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

D. Scientific (Continued)

1. a. (3) Information as to biological and agricultural research plans, programs, and objectives. (U)

2. Chemistry and Metallurgy

a. Communist China is attempting to establish chemical and metallurgical industries to take care of the needs of an expanding economy. To accomplish this end, a broad basic and applied research effort is needed. This is still in the early stages. It is our hope to be able to follow the accomplishments of this program to enable a projection to be made of what to expect in the future from Communist China. (C)

(1) What is the organization for basic research in chemistry and metallurgy? For applied research. (C)

(2) What are the current research projects and recent accomplishments in these fields? What are the plans or goals? (C)

(3) Describe the research facilities. Are any of these being expanded? (C)

(4) Data on research personnel is desired - their current affiliation and the nature of their research. (C)

(5) What is the coordination between Soviet and Chinese research efforts? (C)

3. Electronics

a. The Chinese Communist claim to be developing and manufacturing military electronics equipment such as radars, radio communication equipment for jet airplanes, and navigational units. (C)

(1) The prompt reporting of all data on military electronics equipment is required. Particularly valuable would be direct observation of such equipment by a competent individual. (C)

b. In electronics, the Chinese envisage self-sufficiency in technical equipment within 5 years, and at their present rate of progress, are likely to achieve this for a variety of essential electronics components, materials and apparatus. Within 8 years they

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

D. Scientific (Continued)

3. b. (Continued)

expect to be capable of independent design and research, and probably will attain this status for most important areas in electronics. They are currently believed capable of adapting many relatively sophisticated electronic devices of foreign design to their needs. (C)

(1) Information is desired regarding the nature of the Chinese electronics program, including organization, facilities, policy and plans in the research and development of electronic devices. (C)

c. Data on Chinese personnel concerned with electronics research and development are required. (C) (In all cases, the characters or equivalent standard telegraphic code numbers for Chinese names should be given.)

(1) Information is desired on their present affiliations and the nature of their research work. (C)

(2) What are their contacts with Soviet organizations and personnel? (C)

(3) What is their educational and scientific background? (C)

4. Guided Missiles

a. Observation stations for tracking Soviet artificial satellites have been established in Canton, Peiping, Nanking, Lanchow, Kummung and Lhasa. The Soviets have furnished observation equipment for these stations. (U)

(1) Information is desired on the establishment of new tracking stations in other locations in Communist China. (U)

(2) Information is desired on contacts between these stations and the Soviets which could indicate plans for future satellite launchings. (S)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

D. Scientific (Continued)

5. Astronomy, Upper Atmosphere and Space

a. The Communist Chinese have been cooperating with the USSR in radio astronomical expeditions and have recently reported the construction of their first radio telescope. (S)

(1) Information is desired on their activities in this field, particularly as they might relate to the Soviet upper atmosphere and space program. (S)

b. The Communist Chinese have claimed that they will place into orbit an artificial earth satellite. (S)

(1) Information is desired on any activities relating to this subject. (S)

6. Terrestrial Geophysics

a. Soviet and East German geophysicists have been associated with the construction and operation of several Communist Chinese geomagnetic and seismological observatories. Military detection research is suspected at the Canton station, for example.

(1) Information needed from all Communist Chinese geophysical stations includes: name, location, specific research activity and any known or suspected applications, the description, make and use of geophysical instruments, biographic and specialized activity information on personnel and visitors. (OUO)

b. Soviet and Chinese gravimeterists have conducted gravity surveys in China of value to cartography, geodesy, missile guidance, and mineral prospecting. Copies of the data itself probably will never be released, but would be very valuable if available. (S)

(1) In any case information is needed on all gravity surveys made in China including areas and places surveyed; number, size, and make-up of survey parties; detailed description of the instruments used; methods by which data is processed, or transmitted, where it is sent and how it is reduced and used; biographic information on all scientific or technical personnel, including visitors. (OUO)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

D. Scientific (Continued)

6. c. Several years ago Communist China and Hungarian earth current, or geo-electricity, experts cooperated in making simultaneous earth current measurements. The Soviets have also done a great deal of earth current research.

(1) Information is needed on Chinese earth current research at Peiping and at any other Communist Chinese stations, co-operation or joint-efforts with foreign scientists and institutions, known or suspected applications of this research, detailed description of the instruments used, and biographic information on personnel and foreign visitors. (OUO)

7. Meteorology

a. Current information indicates the Chinese Communists have been very active in weather modification experiments. They have been seeding clouds with dry ice and other agents to increase rainfall. (OUO)

(1) Continuing information is required on Communist Chinese weather modification experiments and activities. (OUO)

b. The Chinese Communists have indicated their intention to utilize computers for weather forecasting as they become available. (OUO)

(1) Information is desired on their activities in this field. Information is also desired on location of the computer and personnel involved in the program. (OUO)

8. Oceanography

a. The Sino-Soviet Bloc countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean have undertaken a program of joint oceanographic surveys. (OUO)

(1) Any information about these surveys is desired. (OUO)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

D. Scientific (Continued)

9. Nuclear Energy

a. The Chinese nuclear energy program entered an active phase when the 6-10 MW research reactor supplied by the USSR came into operation in mid-1958 at the Institute of Atomic Energy in Peking. Other nuclear energy research centers are reported to be at Wuhan, Tientain, Hsi-An, Canton, and Shanghai. Very little information is available on any aspect of the Chinese nuclear energy program. (S)

(1) Where are the Chinese centers for nuclear energy research--exact locations and site lay-outs? What information is available on the number of persons employed, names of leading personnel, equipment in operation or under construction and major research efforts at each research center? (OUO)

(2) What is the extent of the exploitation (prospecting, mining and refining) of domestic supplies of nuclear raw materials; such as, uranium, thorium, zirconium, and beryllium? (OUO)

(3) What is the extent of production of heavy water and nuclear pure graphite? (OUO)

(4) What is the extent of Soviet and Satellite assistance in the Chinese nuclear energy program--personnel, training, supply of equipment, and in the exploitation of raw materials? (OUO)

(5) What are the plans for the use of nuclear energy in a weapons program? Are there any plans for the Chinese to acquire nuclear weapons from the USSR? What nuclear weapons testing and storage sites have been planned or constructed? What is the extent of nuclear weapons training given to Chinese troops? (C)

10. Scientific and Technical Manpower and Education

a. A new graduate degree program got underway in 1956 and a new policy of sending only graduate students for training in the Soviet Union was announced in mid-1957, both programs aimed at increasing the number of scientists. Since the Fall of 1957 nothing has been said about these programs by the Communists. In June 1958, there was an announcement of the establishment of a new University of Science and Technology. A February 1959 Communist announcement indicated that only 5,500 Chinese students were studying

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

D. Scientific (Continued)

in the Soviet Union. This number is far fewer than would be expected from the quotas set up in the First Five-Year plan and indicates that the rate of sending new students to the Soviet Union was reduced from about 2,000 per year to less than 200 per year for the years 1957 and 1958. Information is needed on the graduate training program and on training in the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries. (C)

(1) Has the quality of undergraduate training been a major hindrance to the expansion of the graduate training program? (C)

(2) Was the new University of Science and Technology established because the regular universities and colleges had failed to prepare students adequately for graduate work? (C)

(3) Has the expansion of the graduate program in China been temporarily postponed pending the improvement of undergraduate preparation? (C)

(4) Is the great change in the rate of sending students to the Soviet Union a result of the new policy of sending only graduate students? (C)

(5) Is the new policy ending the dispatch of undergraduate students to the Soviet Union the consequence of 1) an effort to conserve foreign exchange, 2) a reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to accept large numbers of Chinese students, 3) some political reason such as possibly a Chinese Communist desire to avoid exposing undergraduates to the somewhat more liberal atmosphere of Soviet universities, or 4) for some other reason? (C)

(6) Is there any indication of the Soviet Union attempting to hold back the expansion of the number of well-trained Chinese scientists? (C)

11. Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of the Peoples Republic of China - October 1959

a. Because of the particular importance attached by the Chinese Communists to this anniversary, extra ordinary preparations for the celebration are already underway. As has been the case in past anniversaries of various kinds, part of the celebration will almost certainly consist of a massive display of the results of Chinese research, development, and production efforts. (C)

(1) Any information that may be available on Communist Chinese scientific advances is desired, particularly on electronics, chemistry, and nuclear physics. (C)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic

1. General

a. Agricultural and industrial targets for the Chinese Communist Second Five Year Plan (1958-62) were first made public at the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956. Many of the goals for 1962 were claimed to have been surpassed in the great "leap forward" effort of 1958, but because of the drive to achieve higher physical output at almost any costs, it is believed that plans and the planning system were thrown into disorder. Skepticism about their claims for 1958 and their goals for 1959 were justified by the Central Committee communique of 26 August 1959, in which figures for the 1958 production of several important agricultural and industrial commodities were lowered, and the four main targets of grain, cotton, steel, and coal for 1959 were cut back. To improve our understanding of current economic activity in Communist China we would like to obtain information on the following:

(1) Further revisions of agricultural and industrial targets for 1959 and for the Second Five Year Plan as a whole. (U)

(2) Any evidence that the exaggerated claims for agricultural production in 1958 have been revised even further. Any information on the division of the 1958 and 1959 grain figures into their components - rice, wheat, corn, sweet potatoes, etc. (U)

(3) Any information of a conflict between a group in the top leadership urging "Balanced and rational" planning and a group urging a renewal and intensification of the "leap forward". (U)

b. Developments during the early period of the commune movement are fairly well known by now, but a new trend is currently developing -- a decided slackening of control over the daily lives and activities of the commune members. The recent developments which indicate an apparent drawing back from the full-blown commune idea are: a relaxation in the regulations governing membership in messhalls; the reinstatement of private plots to households; the return of some livestock to individual care; a reemphasis on sideline occupations; an increased emphasis on incentive wages; the opening of limited free markets within communes; and the reported reopening of "lower level tax offices" to improve the work of collecting rural taxes. We would like supporting evidence on the above developments--evidence which does not appear in the press or periodicals, or over broadcasts which we normally receive. Attention should be given both to evidence of deterioration of the structure of the commune, and to more recent Party reaffirmation of the vital role of the commune. Have any concessions granted to the peasants been withdrawn? Have any functions been restored to the communes? (U)

COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic (Continued)

October 1959-January 1960

2. Agriculture

a. During the winter months, the Communists planned to complete numerous large-scale water conservancy projects throughout the country. (U)

(U) (1) What increase in irrigated acreage has resulted?

(2) What effect has the water conservancy effort had on the land utilization pattern of the country? (U)

(3) What percent of the grain crops in China by type were under irrigation in 1959? (U)

b. During the winter months fertilizers were accumulated for application on spring and summer sown crops. (U)

(1) How much fertilizer, by type and amount, was accumulated? (U)

(2) What was the rate of application on the various spring and summer sown crops? (U)

c. Food shortages were reported in various areas during 1959. Official sources attribute shortages in urban areas to lack of transport. Further information is desired on the causes of shortages, their severity, their duration, and on the measures taken by the regime to end shortages. (U)

d. To what extent has hog-raising, poultry-raising and production of vegetables and other subsidiary items reverted to private management? (U)

e. The Communists have announced plans to double-crop areas of North China with wheat and rice. What progress was achieved during 1958 and 1959? (U)

f. During 1959, Communist China has been beset with various natural calamities, primarily floods and severe droughts. Although the Communists may be exaggerating to some extent the seriousness of the weather conditions in order to cover up agricultural policy mistakes, sufficient information on weather conditions is available which substantiates to some extent their occurrence. (U)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic (Continued)

October-1959-January 1960

2. Agriculture (Continued)

f. (1) What has been the extent of crop damage due to natural calamities in 1959? How much area affected? What were the yield losses by crops? (U)

(2) How effective have their irrigation facilities been, particularly those constructed during the leap-forward period, in reducing losses? (U)

(3) To what extent have irrigation facilities such as ponds, catchment basins, reservoirs, etc., which are primarily dependent upon rainfall, been effective in alleviating drought conditions? (U)

g. The Chinese Communists have made little mention of their 1959 cotton crop. The original plan called for a crop of 5 million tons, recently lowered to 2.3 million tons. The unusual lack of reporting on this crop would tend to raise suspicions as to the actual condition of the crop. (U)

(1) How much area was planted to cotton in 1959? (U)

(2) Has the cotton crop suffered exceptionally high losses due to natural calamities in 1959? (U)

h. What is the composition of miscellaneous grains, by type and amount, for 1958 and 1959? (U)

i. Deep-plowing was to have been accomplished on most of the area sown to winter wheat in the Fall of 1958. What effect has this had on yields and total production of the wheat crops? (U) What spring and summer sown crops were grown on deep-plowed land? (U)

j. The quality of published statistics, especially in agriculture, deteriorated in 1958. The August 1959 communique of the Central Committee contained sharp downward revisions of the original 1958 production claims, but some (e.g., grains) still appear high. In addition, no breakdown was given as to the composition of the revised 250 million ton claim for grain. We would be interested in any further discussions and evaluations of the 1958 claims. (C)

k. Communist announcements of the value of agricultural and industrial production are now being given in 1957 prices instead of constant 1952 prices that were reported for the period up through 1957. In evaluating price changes, information on farm procurement prices and prices for producer goods is of particular importance. Any current Chinese Communist price lists and specific discussions of changes in prices for important commodities are important in arriving at aggregate value figures for the Chinese economy. (S)

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COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic (Continued)

2. Agriculture (Continued)

1. Occasional mention is made by Peiping about the number of women working on farms and the importance of this work. Any information on this subject, particularly numbers of women employed, tasks to which they are assigned, whether they work in teams with men or separately, their pay compared to men, and what jobs the men are concentrating on now that women have become more important in farm work is of interest. (U)

m. State farms are still mentioned by Peiping. What is their present purpose, are their numbers increasing, how many are there now in each province, what are the plans for their future, what is their relationship to the communes and local government in general? Is there any indication that they may be the forerunner of an eventual further reorganization of the communes to achieve "ownership by all the people"? (U)

n. What are the developments with respect to farm production of methane gas for local heating, power, and lighting?(U)

3. Transportation

a. During 1959-60 continued increases in Chinese railroad traffic performance can probably be achieved only by sizeable increases in the freight car and locomotive parks, rather than by much further improvement in operating efficiency, where the limits appear already to have been reached or exceeded. (S)

(1) What was the total inventory of main line freight cars and locomotives at the end of 1958, mid-1959, and the end of 1959? (S)

(2) How many locomotives were imported during 1959? (S)

(3) What was the absolute level of railroad investment in 1959, and the breakdown of investment among new line construction, improvement of existing lines, and increase in the rolling stock park? (S)

b. Although the Chinese have recently released more data concerning the commodity composition of freight traffic, the information is not adequate for a completely accurate appraisal of commodity movements. (C)

COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic (Continued)

3. Transportation (Continued)

b. (1) What was the commodity composition of the tons originated by the railroads, by motor truck transport, and by inland and coastal water transport during 1959. (C)

(2) What percentages of the total output of petroleum products were moved by each form of transport from refineries or points of import to consumers? (C)

c. The Ministry of Railroads and the provincial or city railroad bureau began a reorganization in January 1958. (OUO)

(1) What is the present table of organization of the Ministry of Railroads? (S)

(2) What is the division of responsibility between the Ministry in Peking and the railroad bureaus for railroad operation and construction? (C)

(3) In what cities are the railroad bureaus located and what are the boundaries of each bureau? (C)

d. The Chinese Communists have announced that the volume of highway freight traffic during the first quarter of 1959 was 73 percent higher than the first quarter of 1958. (OUO)

(1) What was the volume of highway freight traffic during the first quarter of 1959 in absolute terms? (C)

(2) Has the large percentage increase been accomplished mainly in the motor truck sector of highway transportation or in the primitive sector (that is, all highway transportation other than motor truck)? (C)

(3) If the primitive sector has accounted for a large portion of this 73 percent increase, what additional labor was required? (C)

e. The Chinese Communists realized the tremendous gains of 1958 in motor truck transport largely by increased utilization of trucks. This created a shortage of spare parts. (S)

(1) To what extent has this shortage affected performance in 1959? (C)

(2) Have the Chinese placed priority on the construction of additional repair facilities? (C)

COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic (Continued)

3. Transportation (Continued)

f. It appears that 1958 motor truck performance was near the limit possible with available liquid fuel. (S)

(1) What was the fuel requirement for 1958 performance? (S)

(2) What portion of total performance is accomplished by non-liquid fuel trucks? (S)

(3) What portion of the liquid fuel requirement is imported? (S)

g. During 1958, especially during the period from October to December, the People's Liberation Army supplied 13,000 motor vehicles to the Iron and steel drive. A press announcement of March 1959 indicated that in 1959 2,480 trucks had been sent to iron and steel production centers to be used for approximately six months. (OUO)

(1) Did this early dispatch of PLA trucks indicate that truck transport was already experiencing difficulties? (C)

(2) How many PLA trucks were needed during 1959 to assist civilian motor truck transport? (C)

(3) What was the actual contribution of the PLA trucks in terms of performance during 1958 and 1959? (C)

h. Imports of motor trucks to China showed a large increase in 1958. (OUO)

(1) Did the Chinese find it necessary to again import large numbers of trucks during 1959 or did domestic production provide the number of vehicles which could be effectively employed? (C)

i. In late 1958 the formation of a new shipping organization called the Ocean Transport Bureau was observed. The concern of this organization in the field of international shipping indicates that its mission may be the organization of a Chinese maritime fleet for international shipping. If this is the case, the international service would probably be initiated by a Chinese-built ship, the YUEH CHIN (Leap Forward). (S)

(1) Report immediately any indications of the initiation of an international shipping service under the Chinese flag. (S)

COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic (Continued)

October 1959-January 1960

3. Transportation (Continued)

i. (2) Have any trade agreements negotiated by the Chinese contained clauses requiring the movement of goods in Chinese vessels? (S)

(3) Have any efforts to screen maritime personnel for duty outside the country been noted? (S)

(4) When will the YUEH CHIN be fitted out and ready to sail? When will the next ship of the same class be launched? (C)

(5) Have the purchase of any vessels by the Chinese since March 1959 been observed? (S)

j. Continuing current information is needed on international shipping to Communist China, particularly in connection with the tension in the Taiwan Straits area. Any changes in pattern, such as a sharp increase or cessation of tanker movements should be watched for especially. Chinese Communist port closures should also be reported promptly. (S)

4. Iron and Steel

a. The Chinese Communist plan to produce 12 million tons of crude steel in 1959. At the beginning of 1959, Communist China lacked sufficient casting, forging, and rolling facilities to finish 12 million tons of crude steel. As a result, the Chinese are trying to build or import enough finishing equipment to remedy the situation. China has not published any official, annual production figures for steel mill products (rolled steel, forgings, castings) since 1956, probably because of the imbalance between crude steel and steel finishing capacity.

(1) Report any information relating to the success or failure of Communist China to provide enough finishing facilities to match its crude steel production. (C)

(2) Report any large rolling mills installed, planned, or imported. (C)

(3) How much finished steel did Communist China produce in 1957 and in 1958, and what is the planned production for 1959? If possible, the figures should be broken down into three categories: castings, forgings, and rolled steel. (C)

COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)

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E. Economic (Continued)

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4. Iron and Steel (Continued)

a. (4) In view of the lowered 1959 steel target of 12 million tons and the reduced claim of 8 million tons of useable steel produced in 1958, we are interested in:

(a) The list of the 18 "key" iron and steel enterprises.

(b) New targets for iron and steel for 1960 and beyond.

5. Telecommunications

a. Available information indicates that construction has begun on a television station at Canton. Information is requested on the status of this station, including an indication of when it will become operational. (S)

b. Communist China is probably interested in introducing tropospheric scatter communications to supplement its meager telecommunications transmission base. Information is requested concerning the development and introduction of this advanced telecommunications technique in the country. (S)

6. Trade

a. Communist China's exports to and imports from the Free World were increased enormously in 1958, but have fallen off in recent months. (C)

(1) Report any indications of a reversal in the decline in Communist China's trade with the Free World.

b. Trade relations between Communist China and Japan were broken off in mid-1958. Recently, we have received indications of a thaw in Sino-Japanese relations, but trade on a significant scale has not been resumed.

(1) Report any indications of a resumption of Chinese - Japanese trade relations.

c. In the past several years Communist China has developed large deposits of borax and in 1959 began exporting substantial quantities to other Bloc countries. Poland is the only Soviet Bloc country now authorized to obtain boron products from the Free World under COCOM policy. In order to assess import requirements of the Soviet Bloc, particularly of Poland, for borax, it would be helpful to obtain the following information: (S)

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E. Economic (Continued)

6. Trade (Continued)

c. (1) How much is Communist China exporting and to what countries? Provide detailed data on such shipments for 1958 and 1959, including quantities, grades of products, and prices. (S)

d. Recent reporting indicates that the Chinese are seeking to purchase from Western European sources various advanced types of boron compounds with missile fuel application. (C)

(1) Identify Chinese Communist purchasers, end-users, and any indication of the uses to be made of these commodities in Communist China. (C)

(2) Identify possible Western European suppliers of these boron compounds to Communist China, the quantities involved, methods and dates of proposed shipments (including techniques for evading Free World export controls). (C)

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# PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

## HONG KONG and MACAO

1. Any indications that the Chinese Communists are utilizing their recently-proclaimed 'territorial waters' to hamper or restrict access to Hong Kong and/or Macao? (C)
2. Has Hong Kong's decreasing value as an entrepot to Communist China been off-set by the colony's value to Peiping as a source of foreign exchange and as an outlet for Chinese Communist trade abroad? How do the entrepreneurs of the colony, especially the Chinese, view their ability to compete with Communist China in the markets of South and South East Asia? Are there any thoughts of Hong Kong becoming a center of manufacture of commodities for consumption on the Mainland in view of its decreasing value as an entrepot? (C)
3. Details on the current Chinese Communist apparatus in Hong Kong and Macao (personnel, organization, methods of operation, channels for direction from the mainland, etc.). (C)
4. Any indications of Chinese Communist or Chinese Nationalist activities or plans which might lead to disorders within the colonies, particularly during the October holidays? (C)
5. Changing attitudes of the Hong Kong Chinese and Macaonese toward Communism, the Chinese Nationalists, and the colonial administration. (C)
6. How does knowledgeable opinion in Hong Kong government, financial and business circles estimate the political and financial future of Hong Kong? (C)
7. To what extent do the Chinese Communists use Hong Kong/Macao as a channel for covert contact with other Asian Communist movements or with overseas Chinese?
  - a. What is the role of the Hong Kong branch of the Bank of China in such activity? (S)
8. What is the extent of Communist control over local labor, press and public relations media, social organizations, and business organizations of Hong Kong and Macao? Have the Communists succeeded in penetrating the local governments and local security forces? If so, to what extent? Information and evidence of over-all Chinese Communist strategy and tactics regarding Hong Kong and Macao is needed. (S)

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HONG KONG and MACAO (Continued)

9. Details and information are needed on the kind, extent and effectiveness of Chinese Nationalist activity in both colonies. (S)

a. Are the Nationalists running operations into the mainland from either or both colonies? (S)

b. If so, how successful are such operations? (S)

10. Continuing information is needed on the kind and extent of anti-subversive measures pursued by the authorities in both colonies. How effective are such measures? (S)

a. How far are the respective local authorities willing to go to control internal subversion? (S)

11. To what extent are restrictions on trade with Communist China being violated in the two colonies? (S)

12. Detailed information is desired concerning the Hong Kong branch of the Bank of China in promoting trade:

a. Between Hong Kong and the Communist mainland;

b. Between Communist China and Southeast Asia;

c. With other free Asian countries. (S)

13. What measures is the Hong Kong Government taking to control the activities of the Triad Criminal gangs? (C)

14. Are local security forces capable of preventing large scale civil disturbances and of controlling such disturbances if once started? (C)

a. Would the police require military assistance to maintain civil order in such an event or in the event of a Chinese Communist military invasion? (C)

15. Information is needed on the capability of the Macao police and armed forces to maintain internal order, their capability to prevent, contain, and quell local disturbances. (C)

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HONG KONG and MACAO (Continued)

17. Any new developments regarding Chinese Nationalist and/or Chinese Communist representation in Macao? (C)

18. Has the modification of international strategic trade controls accomplished in mid-1958 and consequent adjustments in the UK trade control structure affected the enforcement activities of (a) the Hong Kong authorities, or (b) the Consulate General? (S)

19. Any indications of Chinese Communist pressure for the physical take-over of Macao or Portuguese inclination to relinquish control? (C)

20. Agencia Commercial Progresso (ACP) of Hong Kong and Macao (owner: one of the most consistent suppliers of embargoed items to Communist China, Stanley HO), has recently been denied US licensing privileges. The majority of ACP's imports are known to reach Communist China through such means as: resale to Communist Chinese purchasing agencies or other firms that immediately resell to China; bribery, smuggling and falsification of documents. Evidence exists indicating that the firm will probably continue circumventing US and COCOM export controls by utilizing "cover" firms or other subterfuges to obtain strategic commodities for Communist China. (C)

a. Provide information on Agencia Commercial Progresso's (ACP) procurement of strategic commodities from the West. Identify contacts or "cover" firms and/or other methods utilized by the firm to obtain such imports. (C)

b. Report evidences of ACP's transshipment of these commodities to Communist China, including origin, quantities and description of the goods, other firms or individuals involved in the transactions, financial and shipping arrangements, routing, and documentation utilized. (C)

c. Provide information on firms, other than ACP, which are owned, controlled, or directed by Stanley HO or which operate as affiliates or subsidiaries of ACP. (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1959)

INDONESIA

The new Indonesian cabinet assumed office in July 1959 under the revived 1945 constitution which gives a preponderance of power to the executive branch of government at the expense of the legislative branch. The new cabinet is under strong army influence. The trio guiding the government, in order of their power, are President-Premier Sukarno, Army Chief of Staff and Defense Minister General Nasution, and First Minister Djuanda. The government conducts its affairs against a background of chaotic economic conditions, quietly growing Communist strength, and continuing guerrilla warfare in all major islands. With the exception of the Communists, political parties are of minor importance. (C)

A. Political - Military

1. Sukarno

- a. Indications of disagreement with General Nasution, efforts to create dissension in the army or to back particular officers other than Nasution. (S)
- b. Indications of his strong support of the army. (C)
- c. Who are Sukarno's principal advisors? What individuals have chief access to palace? Extent to which he solicits opinions and advice. (S)
- d. What is the power relationship between Sukarno and Suryadarma, Air Force Chief of Staff? (S)
- e. State of Sukarno's health. Probable successors should he die or retire. (S)
- f. Extent to which Sukarno participates in both day to day government and in major policy decisions under the new constitution? To what extent does he initiate policy? (C)
- g. Status of his prestige, particularly in Java. (C)

2. Army

- a. Extent of power in the cabinet. (C)

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INDONESIA (Continued)

A. Political (= Military (Continued)

2. Army (Continued)

- b. Extent of corruption in the army. (C)
- c. Effectiveness of the army-controlled Front for National Liberation in controlling Communist activities. (C)
- d. Extent of Communist-infiltration in army. (S)
- e. Extent of army loyalty to Sukarno and Nasution. (C)
- f. Indications that the army has spread itself too thin and is becoming less effective at its various tasks (i.e., straight military, administration, economic direction, and anti-Communist activity). (C)
- g. Indications of significant army factionalism. (C)
- h. Effectiveness of anti-Communist activities. (S)

3. Cabinet and Civil Government

a. Role of three newly appointed government organizations and their chairmen:

Abdulgani. (C) (1) 46-member Supreme Advisory Council under Ruslan

Mohamad Yamin. (C) (2) 77-member National Planning Board under

(3) 5-member BAPEKAN (agency for supervision of the activities of the state apparatus) under the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengku Buwono IX. (C)

b. Roles of various cabinet components: 11 full ministers; 25 assistant ministers; 7 ex officio ministers. Particularly, are 25 assistant ministers permitted to initiate policy and how much independence of action do they have? (C)

4. Insecurity

a. Provincial revolt (Sumatra, North Celebes).

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INDONESIA (Continued)

A. Political - Military (Continued)

4. Insecurity (Continued)

a. (1) Prospects for and activity toward compromise or other resolution of provincial revolt. (S)

(2) Highlights of military activity. (C)

(3) Internal rebel policy conflicts, supply efforts, popular support. (C)

b. Darul Islam (Atjeh, West and Central Java, South Celebes, South Borneo).

(1) Military highlights. (C)

(2) Popular support. (C)

(3) Supply efforts. (C)

5. Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian): Any political or paramilitary activity directed toward acquisition of West Irian. (C)

B. Communism

1. Details on Communist Party (PKI) strength; present activity; evidence of increased growth and influence. (S)

a. Information on or speculation about future plans. (S)

b. Sources of Communist funds. (S)

2. Visits of Indonesian Communists to other countries and visits of foreign Communists to Indonesia. (S)

3. Indications of existence of Communist armed forces, their size and activity. (S)

4. Evidence of Communist infiltration of civil government, army and police, navy and air force. (S)

5. Reliable evidence and indications of direct Communist influence on President Sukarno. (S)

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INDONESIA (Continued)

B. Communism (Continued)

6. Effectiveness of Communist groups within army-controlled National Liberation Front. (S)

7. Activities of principal Communist front groups: veterans (PERBEPSI--All Indonesian Union of Former Armed Combatants); labor SOBSI (All-Indonesian Federation of Workers); youth (Pemuda or Pemuda Rakjat--People's Youth); peasants (BTI--Indonesian Farmers' Front). (S)

8. Indications of preparations for underground and crypto activity should army intensify anti-Communist activity. (S)

C. Foreign Relations

Significant developments regarding Indonesia's foreign policy and diplomatic relations, particularly with: (C)

1. The Middle Eastern nations. (C)
2. The US. (C)
3. The Netherlands. (C)
4. The USSR. (C)
5. Communist China. (C)

6. Activities of Sino-Soviet bloc embassies and consulates: Any recent information on movements and contacts of Sino-Soviet bloc officials particularly among the following: government circles, Communist and Communist-front groups, Chinese community, educational circles. (S)

a. Reaction of Indonesian government to Sino-Soviet bloc activity. (C)

b. Sino-Soviet exchange and training programs. (C)

c. Any increases in mission strengths and significant changes in personnel. (S)

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INDONESIA (Continued)

D. Economic

1. Sino-Soviet Bloc Assistance: Detailed information on any Sino-Soviet assistance to Indonesia. (C)
  - a. Manner of implementation; number of technicians involved. (C)
2. Labor: Information on activities of SOBSI--Indonesia's Communist-controlled labor federation; movements and contacts--national and international--of its leaders. (S)
  - a. Activities of non-Communist unions. (C)
3. Agriculture: Current agricultural production, trade and consumption. (C)
4. Government Finance: Central government finance in general, including current data on balance of payments, government loans and advances, revenues and expenditures, and international financial transactions involving Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. (C)
5. Stabilization and Development Plans: (U)
  - a. Information on plans to arrest economic deterioration, on stabilization measures, and on development programs. Include financial details, notably information on availability of local currency funds and prospective need for foreign aid. (U)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

LAOS

A. Political - Internal

Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone's grant of full powers in January ensured his anti-Communist government of at least a year in which, unfettered by a legislature that had become increasingly irresponsible, to restore popular confidence in the government. Meanwhile, Laos is in a period of political transition in which traditional power relationships based on a system of alliance between representatives of a few powerful clans are being successfully challenged by political movements organized on a broader popular base. (C)

1. The Rally of the Lao People (RLP): The RLP has suffered a number of reverses during the past few months; have these developments accentuated divisive pressures in the RLP? What deputies support the following party leaders: Phoui Sananikone, Katay, Souvanna Phouma, Pheng Phongsavan? What steps is the party taking to build a grass roots organization? Is the party developing "new faces" for the next campaign? Which deputies, if any, are working to build popular following in the provinces? Is Phoui's position as party leader being eroded by his role as national leader? Attitude and motivation of Pheng Phongsavan; nature of his relationship with left opposition? (C)

2. The Committee for the Defense of the National Interest (CDNI): Information on the national and provincial organization--activities, size and membership. Relationship between the army and the CDNI. Does the army dominate CDNI? Are there conflicts of interest between civilian CDNI leaders and their army collaboration? Information is needed on CDNI sponsored activities such as youth and veterans' rallies. What is the relative influence within the CDNI of Colonel Phoumi, General Ouane, Sisouk Na Champassak, Khamphan Panya, Inpeng Suryadhay, the Colonel Oudone Sananikone. What impact has the CDNI had on the following groups: Buddhist monkhood, civil servants, junior army officers, school teachers, minority peoples. (S)

3. Relations between the CDNI and the RLP: The rapid rise to power of the CDNI threatens the privileged position of the RLP. Friction between the two groups has impeded the development of strong governmental action. Information is needed on efforts to find a modus vivendi between the two groups. Which leaders are opposed to cooperation? What are the relations between provincial and local leaders of the two parties? Are RLP members transferring to the CDNI? Do CDNI activists characterize the CDNI as a nonpartisan movement campaigning for better government or as a political party seeking to elect its own candidates? (C)



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LAOS (Continued)

A. Political - Internal

4. The Santiphab: How "deep" is the alliance between the Santiphab and the Communist dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ)? Is Quinim Pholsena attempting to re-establish his link with National Union leader Bong Souvannavong? Is the Santiphab winning coverts from the RLP? (C)

5. The Democrats: What is the relationship between the Democrats and the NLHZ? What role does Colonel Phoumi Nosavan play in the Democrat party? Are the Democrats losing popular support in Savannakhet province? (C)

6. NLHZ - Communist Party: Souphannouvong and part of NLHZ Central Committee are under arrest in Vientiane. Which NLHZ leaders are now in control of the NLHZ? Has the previously reported split between nationalist elements (Souphannouvong-Phoumi) and military Communists (Nouhak-Khamtay-Kaysone) been resolved in favor of the latter? Has government repression weakened or stiffened the resolve of NLHZ members? Report on the strength, morale and social composition of the NLHZ. To what extent is the NLHZ succeeding in winning converts among Buddhist monks, army, bureaucracy, and school teachers? NLHZ propaganda themes. Efforts by NLHZ to attract disaffected members of RLP. Growth or decline in NLHZ membership, party finances; relations between NLHZ and Communist directorate; relations between latter and international Communism. (S)

B. Political - International

1. To what degree does Laos' recent shift to a more openly pro-Free World position reflect the opinion of the politically conscious minority? (C)

2. Information on the popular reaction to the threatening propaganda emanating from Hanoi and Peiping. (OUO)

3. Expansion of Laos' diplomatic contacts with other nations, particularly those of the Communist bloc. Information on any Bloc offers of economic aid. (C)

4. Evidence of anti-US feeling. (C)

5. Any significant development in Laotian foreign policy; especially in relations with France, India, Thailand, South Vietnam. (C)

6. Attitude of Laos towards developments in Cambodia. (C)

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LAOS (Continued)

B. Political - International

7. Any change in Laos' opposition to the reconvening of the ICC, or retreat from its position that it has fulfilled all the provisions of the Geneva Accords. (S)

8. Laotian government attitude towards regional cooperation. (C)

C. Social

1. Information on the flow of refugees across the Chinese Communist border. (C)

2. Attitudes of minority peoples--Meo, Kha, tribal Thai, etc., --toward the government. To what extent do they feel the government is responsive to their problems. (C)

3. Evidence of NLHZ influence among minority peoples. (C)

4. Political activities of Buddhist monks. Evidence of NLHZ penetration of Buddhist hierarchy. (S)

D. Economic

1. Information on development plans. (C)

2. Government measures to stimulate economic activity and end recession. (C)

3. Information on central government finance, budget deficit, level of imports, foreign exchange holdings. (C)

4. Information on rice production. (C)

5. Impact of rural aid--rural self-help program. Information on the development of the transportation system, FAL roads and air-fields construction program. (C)

6. What are the economic relationships, if any, between RLP deputies and CDNI leaders? (S)

E. Military

1. Information on organization, training and capabilities of Laotian army. Developments affecting the capabilities of the Lao Army to maintain internal security. (C)

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LAOS (Continued)

E. Military (Continued)

2. Strength and training functions performed by French Military Mission. Effectiveness of joint US-French training program. (C)
3. What is the effectiveness and loyalty of the police force. (C)
4. Strength, location and activities of KMT forces in Laos. How are they supplied? What is the attitude of the Laotian government toward these troops. (S)
5. Information on the political views or loyalties of key military leaders. Is there a politically ambitious group within the army. How "deep" is the alliance between the army and the CDNI? What are the attitudes of junior officers towards the CDNI, the NLHZ, the RLO? What are the degree of pro-NLHZ sentiment among troops? (S)
6. Location of Communist arms caches. Strength and location of Communist guerrilla bands. How are they supplied? Degree of North Vietnamese support and direction. Is cooperation of villages voluntary or result of intimidation.
7. Information on frontier situation; Laotian efforts to check flow of refugees from China and North Vietnam. Communist strength and activities on borders, developments in disputed areas on Laotian - North Vietnam border. (C)
8. Effectiveness of FAL civic action program. (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

MALAYA AND SINGAPORE

1. There is considerable interest in the new government of Singapore. The political outlook of the new assembly members and cabinet officers is of importance, especially the development of voting blocs, and the identification of PAP assemblymen with the moderate or extremist wings of their party. Also, the government's attitude toward the United States as reflected in private remarks, public statements, and actions. (C)
2. Malayan Communist Party: Current party strength, organizations, leadership activity, and policy. Extent and effectiveness of military effort. Evidence of united front tactics in Malaya and Singapore. Extent of subversion in the two areas; organizations and individuals involved; direction by Chinese Communist Party. (S)
3. Chinese Communist Party: Any evidence of CCP activity in Singapore or Malaya; extent and effectiveness. (S)
4. People's Action Party (PAP): Current activities and strength in Singapore; all groups affiliated with the PAP or directed or influenced by it; names and biographics of individuals involved in PAP and its affiliated and influenced organizations. Of particular interest are any efforts to extend its activity into Federation of Malaya or British Borneo. Also of great interest is any information concerning pro-Communist moves to gain control of the party and through it the government. Careful reporting of rivalry between LEE KUAN YEW and LIM CHIN SIONG and other extreme leftist members of the PAP is desired. Detailed coverage of PAP views on imprisoned PAP leaders is desired. (S)
5. The Singapore People's Alliance (SPA): Activities and strength. Any progress toward developing mass support and of developing effective opposition to the PAP government. (S)
6. Other Parties in Singapore: Activities and strength of the Workers' Party, Liberal Socialists, Labor Front and Citizens' Party.
  - a. Any evidence of renewed far left-wing interest in the Workers' Party or Citizens Party? (C)

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MALAYA AND SINGAPORE (Continued) 25X6A

8. Alliance: Any internal difficulties either among Alliance member organizations or within those organizations? (S)

a. Information on the effect upon the strength of the MCA, the Chinese component of the Alliance party, of any government policy which more or less directly affects the Chinese population. (C)

b. Activities of the MCA rebels who broke away from the party in mid-July. Any plan for establishing a new party? Efforts to establish a link with the PAP, or leading members of it. Efforts to force a new break between the MCA and the Alliance? Activities and plans of Lim Chong Eu. (C)

9. Opposition Parties in Malaya: Activities of the Peoples' Progressive Party, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (IMIP), Labor Party of Malaya (LPM), and the People's Party (Partai Rakyat). Evidence of cooperation of any of these parties with the MCP. Cooperation between the LPM and the People's Party in a National Socialist Front was announced in September 1957. Efforts to develop this coalition into a merger, looking to coalition with the PMIP. Source of IMIP financial backing? (C)

a. Activities and plans of opposition members in the Malayan House of Representatives. (C)

b. Any evidence that the National Front (a coalition of the PMIP, PMU and Party Negara) or any individual element thereof is assuming sufficient strength to threaten UMNO support among the rural Malays. (C)

10. New Parties: Any serious moves to form new parties in either Malaya or Singapore. Details of voter registration in the Federation, particularly racial breakdowns. (C)

11. Religious Groups: What is the Communist influence in the Islamic, Hindu and Christian communities? How is it exercised, and how is it manifested? What evidence is there that religion per se act as an obstacle to the spread of Communism or that they act as a vehicle for the spread of Communism? (C)

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MALAYA AND SINGAPORE (Continued)

12. Attitudes of all parties toward Communist peace moves and united front tactics. (C)
  - a. Details on the selection, finances, biographic data and plans of individuals attending Communist-sponsored meetings abroad. (C)
13. Any information on arms smuggling into Malaya? (S)
14. Any information of increased direct, or indirect, trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc or plans to increase trade with the bloc? (C)
15. Any increase in criticism over presence of Commonwealth forces in Malaya? Any evidence that either the MCP or the government is considering unilateral action to end the Emergency. Up-to-date data on budgetary expenditures for internal security. (C)
16. The foreign policy of the Federation: growth of neutralism; attitude toward the Anglo-Malayan defense treaty; pressures for recognition of Red China; Indonesian influence on Malayan foreign policy. Malaya/Singapore relations with various Asia-African groups. (C)
17. Any signs of deterioration or improvement of race relations among Malay, Chinese, and Indian elements of the population? (C)
18. Volume and pattern of illicit barter traffic entering Malaya and Singapore from disaffected areas of Indonesia. Information concerning activity in Malaya/Singapore to provide military-logistical support to armed dissident groups in Indonesia. (S)
19. Estimates of Communist and pro-Communist membership in the Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC) and its component unions. Details of organized labor's participation in left-wing politics at local and national levels. Parallel information for the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC). (S)
20. Organization, leadership, strength and activities of Communist cells in the school system, especially the Chinese middle schools. Evidence of Communist controls over non-Communist students, signs of Communist or ultranationalist tendencies among students. (S)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

MONGOLIA

A. Political

1. Mongolia has long been regarded as a Soviet satellite. (C)
  - a. How much evidence is there of a rise in either Chinese influence or Mongolian nationalism? (C)
2. Current influence, popular prestige, and relative position in the hierarchy of the following figures: (C)
  - a. Y. Tsedenbal (C)
  - b. L. Tsende (C)
  - c. TS. Dugursuren (C)
  - d. D. Balzhinian (C)
  - e. S. Sambu (C)
  - f. N. Zhagvaral (C)
  - g. D. Molomzhants (C)
  - h. D. Tumur-Ochir (C)
  - i. Genden (C)
3. What has been the fate of those individuals who were demoted or purged in the 30 March 1959 shakeup?
4. What were the real reasons behind the events of 30 March, and how firmly based is the present regime's power?
5. Present influence, membership, and leadership of mass organizations, such as: (C)
  - a. Mongolian Workers' Union. Mongolian trade unions Central Council. (C)

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MONGOLIA (Continued)

A. Political (Continued)

5. b. Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. (C)
- c. Federation of Mongolian Working Women. (C)
- d. The Mongolian Peace Committee. (C)
6. Data is needed regarding the shake-up of November 1958 in which Tsendenbal resumed leadership of both party and government. (C)
7. How do Mongols, particularly the professional classes, view their relations with the Communist bloc and with the non-Communist world? (C)
8. How deeply do foreign influences pervade Mongolian life? (C)
9. Is there any pan-Mongol sentiment, or a desire for greater ties with Inner Mongolia? (C)
10. Are the people basically hostile toward the regime, or do they take pride in its achievements? (C)
11. Is there evidence of groupings within the hierarchy based on personal loyalties? (C)
12. By what means does the Mongolian People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party exert control? (C)
  - a. How efficient is control? Is there nepotism within the party? (C)
13. Data regarding Mongolian courts and legal procedures. Are there any characteristics peculiar to the Mongolian judicial system? (C)
14. Any recent information on ID cards, travel permits, curfews, and other restrictions to personal movement? (C)
15. How successful has the government been in resettling herders? (C)



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MONGOLIA (Continued)

A. Political (Continued)

15. a. How do the herders regard the resettlement program? Additional data on opposition to it. What percent of herds are actually left in private herds? (C)

b. Are herders still allowed to bear arms? (C)

c. What bearing do the new administrative divisions have on the cooperativization? (C)

d. How far has the announced 100% cooperativization of herders gone in fact? (C)

16. Any recent changes in personnel and organization of government ministries? (C)

17. Comment on present Mongolian educational facilities: (C)

a. Curriculum and quality of instruction. (C)

b. What percentage of texts are in Mongolian? (C)

c. Have the number of technical schools increased? (C)

18. Any information on the size and functions of the Commission on Science and Education? (C)

19. What is the present role, number, and importance of Soviet and Chinese advisors in Mongolia? (C)

a. Are they housed separately? (C)

b. Do they mix socially with the Mongolians? (C)

c. Are Chinese laborers employed on state farms? (C)

d. Are their salaries paid by Mongolia? (C)

20. To what extent are the Russian and Chinese languages understood? (C)

21. Any information on the diplomatic community.

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MONGOLIA (Continued)

A. Political (Continued)

22. Data regarding efforts to become a member of or participate in international organizations and conferences? (C)

B. Economic

1. What is the current economic and financial status of Mongolia? (C)

2. To what extent is Mongolia dependent on economic support:

a. From Communist China? (C)

b. From the USSR? (C)

3. Has the establishment of communes in Communist China had any impact? (C)

4. Have there been any revisions in the current Three-Year Plan? (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

NATIONALIST CHINA

A. Political - International

The Chinese Communist threat to the offshore islands continues to present the Chinese Nationalist Government with difficult problems. Accordingly, the state of Nationalist morale, degree of political stability, degree of Communist influence and infiltration, relations between important factions, attitudes of the native Taiwanese in the situation, and the intentions of the government in regard to the offshore islands crisis are prime intelligence targets. (C)

1. What is the current thinking of the government in regard to the offshore island problem? Are there any hostile actions being planned without consultation with US officials? Is there any possibility the Nationalists could be induced to withdraw from the islands during the foreseeable future? What is the true status of the supply situation on the offshore islands? What is the significance of the jet-capable airfield now under construction on Kinmen? (C)

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3. Which senior Nationalist officials tend to be most sympathetic with American policy and cooperative with American officials? Are there any indications of significant anti-American feeling among Nationalist officialdom? Is there any evidence indicating that GRC officials are stirring up anti-American feeling? Is there significant anti-American feeling on Taiwan? If so, how strong is it? What views regarding the US are inculcated in KMT members and through the Youth Corps and the school system, in the youth? (C)

4. Do any Nationalist officials, in private conversations, indicate a personal willingness to accept a "Two Chinas" solution to the Taiwan problem? Is there any support for a cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait? What officials favor reducing the size of the Armed Forces? If such views are held by any officials, what is the impact, present or potential, on GRC stability and policy? Are these views reflected in any groups of the population, and, if so, which? (C)

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NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)

B. Political - Internal

1. What new cliques or factions are in the process of formation within the KMT? What are the strengths of competing cliques within the party? (C)
2. What is likely to take place in the event of President Chiang's death? What indications are there that anyone other than Vice President Chen Cheng will succeed to the presidency? (U)
3. What if any group on Taiwan might attempt to seize power unconstitutionally at the time of the Gimo's death? (U)
4. What steps are being taken either to liberalize or to tighten controls over the populace? What measures are being taken to curb the press? (C)
5. Continuing information is desired upon the relative political strength of Chen and Chiang Ching-kuo. What effect do President Chiang's third-term plans have on relations between Chen Cheng and Chiang Ching-kuo? Who are Chiang Ching-kuo's chief supporters in the Kuomintang and military? (C)
6. Are there any indications of failing health on the part of President Chiang, Vice President Chen or Chiang Ching-kuo? (U)
7. Continuing information is desired on a possible shake-up within either the Nationalist Government or the KMT. (C)
8. Are there significant indications of graft and corruption within the Nationalist Government and the KMT? If so, what is the extent? What is the extent of possible corruption on provincial and local levels of government? Does awareness of corruption, or suspicion that it exists constitute a serious morale factor? How serious is the problem of corruption within the security services? Is there corruption in the armed forces? (C)
9. What are the attitudes toward the administration of young officers of the armed services? Of low and middle-level officials? Of members of "opposition" parties? (U)
10. Who are President Chiang's principal advisors? Which ones are gaining or losing influence? What is the relative degree of influence of the following and what are the significant views of each? (U)

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NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)

B. Political - Internal (Continued)

Chang Chun	George K. C. Yeh
Chang Tao-fan	Yu Ta-wei
Chen Cheng	Dr. Hu Shih
Chiang Ching-kuo	Wang Shu-ming ("Tiger" Wang)
Chou Chih-jou	Sampson Shen
Ho Ying-chin	Wang Shih-Chieh
Peng Meng-chi	Huang Shao-ku
	Yang Chi-tseng
Mme Chiang Kai-Shek	Tang Tsung

11. More information is needed on the Legislative and Control Yuans. What efforts are being made to restore discipline in the Legislative and Control Yuans? (U)

12. What is the state of morale of:

a. Nationalist Government and army personnel. Is there any consistent pattern of differences in morale at various levels? Of friction among the armed services? (U)

b. The mainland population on Taiwan? (U)

c. The native Taiwanese population? (U)

13. What measures is the Nationalist Government taking to control Taiwanese political activity? Is their influence in the government and Kuomintang increasing or decreasing? How concerned is the GRC, what is KMT policy on this point, and how is it implemented? What are Taiwanese prospects for election in the 1960 local elections? Is the government hindering operation of the Kung Lim Pao? What is Taiwanese reaction to the paper's closing? (C)

14. What is the current attitude of the native Taiwanese to the regime? Are relations between mainlanders and Taiwanese improving? What is the attitude of Taiwanese recruits in the service? Is there opposition to the theme of "return to the mainland"? What is the state of morale of Taiwanese soldiers on the offshore islands? What specifically is the attitude of the Taiwanese student elements toward the regime and what is their potential for future leadership in opposition activities? What is the attitude of the rural population, and of the residents of cities outside Taipei, particularly in Tainan, the traditional center of Taiwanese opposition. What is the general attitude of the Taiwanese in the armed forces? (U)

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NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)

B. Political - Internal (Continued)

15. What practical measures have been taken to improve the internal security situation in Taipei and other cities since 1957? How well are the police and other security services now prepared to cope with sudden outbursts by the civilian population? What is the status of the pedicab element? Is it a potential threat to order? (C)

16. Will President Chiang Kai-shek run for a third term in 1960? How will the constitutional impediment be circumvented? (U)

17. Information is needed on the position of political officers in the Armed Services and the rise or decline of influence of the KMT and the General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense. (C)

18. What is the extent of KMT influence on schools and other public private institutions? What are the attitudes toward indoctrination in the San Min Chu I? Is there any feeling in the KMT that the Three Peoples' Principles ought to be revised or discussed in a more realistic fashion? (C)

19. What is the current status of the Local Self-Government Study Group? (U)

C. Communist Influence

1. Information is desired on all offers of "negotiations" of the status of Taiwan made overtly or covertly to individual Chinese Nationalist leaders. Is there any evidence of instances in which such offers have received a favorable reception? Have recent developments increased or decreased receptivity to such offers? (U)

2. What is the scope and extent of Chinese Communist clandestine activity in Taiwan? (C)

3. Is there any evidence that the Taiwanese as a class or Taiwanese independence groups are receptive to Communist overtures? (U)

4. What reception is given on Taiwan to Chinese Communist propaganda broadcasts? What reception does Chinese Communist propaganda receive on the off-shore islands? By what means does propaganda reach Taiwan? (U)

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NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)

C. Communist Influence (Continued)

5. Continuing information is desired on the number of individuals--civilian and military--defecting to the China mainland. (U)

6. Continuing information is desired on persons arrested as Communist suspects. (C)

D. Economic

What is the likelihood of a reactivation of the Central Banks of China as de facto central bank? Similarly what are the prospects of the other non-operating banks and the role of each to the other and to the Bank of Taiwan? Are plans being made to issue currency in larger denominations? (U)

2. How does the GRC's policy of price stabilization affect such groups in the economy as government employees and teachers, farmers, fishermen and city laborers? How do these groups assess their present living conditions and their immediate future in terms of real income, promotion prospects, family needs? (U)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

NORTH KOREA

A. Political - Internal

1. What effect did the reported 1957-58 purge of army officers have on morale and military effectiveness? (C)

2. Comment on degree of influence, popular prestige, and relative position in hierarchy of following figures: (C)

Kim Il-sung	Nam Il	Yi Chong-ok
Choe Yong-kun	Yim Hae	Han Sol-ya
Kim Il	Yi Hyo-sun	Yi Chu-yon
Pak Chong-ae	Chong Il-yong	Han Sang-tu
Pak Kum-chol	Yi Il-kyong	Kim Ik-sun
Kim Kwang-hyop	Kim Chang-man	Ha Ang-chon

3. Any evidence that the designation of Kim Il as First Deputy Premier indicates his selection as Kim Il-sung's heir apparent.

4. Have any new members been added to the Central Committee to replace individuals purged since August 1956? If so, who? (C)

5. Any information on the removal of Han Sol-ya, Ko Chun-taek, Kang Yong-chang, Chu Hwang-sop, Ho Song-taek from cabinet posts in September 1958? (C)

6. Any information on the functioning of North Korean government ministries, including personnel policies and the jurisdiction of the various ministries? (C)

7. Recent developments within the Korean Labor Party hierarchy? (C)

a. Any evidence of groupings based on personal loyalties?

b. Any evidence of ideological splits? (C)

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NORTH KOREA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

7. c. Shifts in personnel and their significance. (C)
- d. Any indications of party discipline and morale. (C)
- e. New techniques of party control over government? (C)
- f. Indications of change in status of "puppet parties."

8. Are there any indications that the Korean Labor Party believes it necessary to adapt standard Soviet doctrine to meet the particular circumstances of North Korean development? (C)

a. In what aspects of party policy does North Korea slavishly follow the Soviet Union? (C)

b. Are there indications that the Chinese Communist Party is looked to as a source of doctrinal guidance--especially with respect to the establishment of rural communes and small-scale industrial establishments? If so, is this tendency increasing? (C)

c. What has been the effect of the industrial reorganization and decentralization moves announced in August 1959? (C)

9. In the reorganization of agricultural cooperatives into large "amalgamated" units is there mention of indebtedness to Chinese Communist or Soviet experience? Are Chinese communes cited as models to be emulated. (C)

10. The Kaesong District has received favored treatment in the past from the Pyongyang government. What are the observable results of this treatment? Are there any indications that such treatment is being modified? (C)

11. Any information on capacity, curriculum, and quality of instruction in North Korean educational institutions? (C)

a. Number of primary and secondary schools? (C)

b. Proportion which provide only part-time instruction?  
(C)

c. Extent to which compulsory middle schools education is enforced? (C)

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NORTH KOREA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

- (C) 11. d. Number of technical middle schools and curriculum?  
e. University enrollment and subjects emphasized? (C)  
f. Where did the professors receive their training? (C)
12. In schools and party groups, what political writings are discussed? (C)  
a. Are Mao Tse-tung's works stressed? (C)
13. Among North Korean students studying abroad what proportion go to Communist China and the Soviet Union? (C)  
a. Is there any relationship between their place of study and the jobs obtained on their return? (C)  
b. Is there correlation between place of study and party status or political reliability? (C)  
c. Information on activities and numbers of North Korean students in other bloc countries. (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, etc). (C)
14. Any information on plans or activities for increased subversion, and infiltration in the RKO. (C)

B. Foreign Affairs

1. What measures are being taken to unify Korea? (C)
2. Are there any indications that North Korea is softening its defiance of UN recommendations regarding elections? (C)
3. Any indications that following the Chinese Communist troops withdrawal Peiping is actively assisting Pyongyang in mustering support among Afro-Asian nations? (C)
4. Any information on North Korean tactics in attempting to gain greater international acceptability? (C)

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NORTH KOREA (Continued)

B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)

4. a. Information on the treatment accorded visiting delegations. (C)

b. What methods are employed in North Korea's efforts to gain non-Bloc recognition? (C)

5. Indications of number, rank, and quality of foreign advisors.

a. How long do they remain in Korea? (C)

b. How are their living conditions? (C)

c. Do they mix easily with the local inhabitants? Are the Soviet more aloof than the Chinese? (C)

25X1X4 7. What measures have been taken to prepare for the resettlement of repatriates from Japan in the event Korean residents in Japan are allowed to return to North Korea? (C)

a. Are the repatriates receiving preferential treatment? (C)

b. How are they adjusting to life in NK? (C)

8. Any information on contacts between North and South Korea? (C)

9. Any information on possible military alliances between North Korea and China or the Soviet Union. Also relations with other bloc members. (C)

C. Military

1. North Korean military capabilities, especially in relationship to ROK forces. (C)

a. Changes in size of forces. (C)

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NORTH KOREA (Continued)

C. Military (Continued)

1. b. Introduction of new weapons and equipment. (C)
  - c. North Korean airforce strength and capabilities and introduction of new equipment. (C)
2. Is North Korean military doctrine influenced appreciably by either Soviet or Chinese doctrine? (C)
3. Size of Chinese Communist military force (probably liaison) remaining in North Korea. (C)
4. Nature of Chinese Communist military assistance with respect to continuing logistics support. (C)
5. Morale of North Korean troops. (C)
6. Relationship of Political officer to commanding officer. (C)
7. Personnel shifts in the high command, with appropriate biographic information where available. (C)
8. Any information of military production including the manufacture of arms, ammunition, and military equipment. (C)
9. Battle tactics of all components. (C)

D. Economic

1. Communes

a. Recent reports assert that North Korea is in the process of adopting a commune system similar to that in Communist China. (C) As of August 1959, however, the Pyongyang regime has not announced the adoption of communes. We would like to know if North Korea actually has adopted or is planning to adopt communes on a nationwide scale, or if experimentation is being carried out anywhere. (U)

2. Agriculture

a. North Korea announced plans to increase total grain production to 5 million tons in 1959, a 1.1 million ton increase over last year's production. (C)

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October 1959 - January 1960

NORTH KOREA (Continued)

D. Economic (Continued)

2. a. (1) What was the claimed production for 1959? (U)

(2) What have been the effects of recent irrigation and flood control efforts on the 1959 crops? What crop losses were suffered from drought and flood? (U)

(3) What is the current total irrigated area in North Korea, by area under permanent irrigation and that irrigation where water is not completely controlled? (U)

(4) What is the distribution of irrigated land among the various crops? (U)

(5) What part of the 1959 sown area was deep-plowed? To what depths? For which crops? How has this affected yields? (U)

(6) How have increased seeding rates and close planting affected crop yields? To what extent and on what crops were these agro-techniques practiced? (U)

b. Amalgamation of the agricultural cooperatives in October 1958 was to pave the way for agricultural mechanization in North Korea. Plans call for the delivery of 5,600 tractors to the countryside in 1959.

(1) What is being done to meet this goal? (U)

(2) What part of the 1959 cultivated area was farmed mechanically? How does this figure compare with that for 1958? (U)

(3) Are these areas producing greater yields than those being farmed by traditional methods? If so, how much? (U)

(4) What crops are involved in these mechanized farming operations? To what degree for each? (U)

c. How much chemical fertilizer was supplied to the countryside for the 1959 crops? What was the distribution among the various crops and what were the respective rates of application? To what degree was the chemical fertilizer supply augmented by the application of manure, compost and other organic materials? (U)

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NORTH KOREA (Continued)

D. Economic (Continued)

2. d. Fruits, especially apples and pears, are the major export of North Korea. Except in some of the northern mountainous regions, fruit can be produced anywhere in the country. Plans have been formulated to greatly increase fruit production within the coming two or three years, and it has been reported that already in 1959 increased amounts of chemical fertilizer and insecticides have been made available to fruit farms. (U)

(1) What amounts of these factors of production have been supplied to fruit farms? How does this compare with previous years? (U)

(2) What is total fruit production for 1959? How much of it is to be exported and what is its value in terms of trade? (U)

e. Taxes-in-kind for grain (including potatoes) were recently reduced from 22.4 percent to 10 percent and in the future are to vary between agricultural regions. (U)

(1) Has this reduction been adhered to with respect to the 1959 crops? (U)

(2) What are the procurement figures for the various grain and industrial crops? (U)

(3) Has there been a difference in procurement between the various agricultural regions as scheduled? (U)

(4) How have the current procurement schedules affected the food ration in North Korea? (U)

3. Transportation

a. The Central Statistics Bureau of the North Korean Government announced large increases in transport performance during 1958-59. Apparently these increases are being achieved by large increases in inventory of railroad equipment and motor trucks, by improvement in operating efficiency and by intensive use of existing equipment. (C)

S E C R E T

Far East PRL  
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NORTH KOREA (Continued)

D. Economic (Continued)

3. a. (1) What is the present inventory of railroad freight cars, locomotives, motor trucks, and busses. (S)

(2) How many freight cars, locomotives, trucks, and busses were imported or produced in North Korea during 1959? (C)

(3) Are there indications that the present inventory is being used intensively without proper maintenance? (C)

(4) What was the average load per loaded freight car in North Korea during 1959 or during any part of the year? (S)

4. Telecommunications

Television services is not yet available in North Korea. Information is requested on the possible construction of television broadcasting facilities in the country in the near future. (S)

5. Iron and Steel

a. During the latter half of 1958 North Korea indicated that in order to fulfill the growing demand for iron and steel materials, and at the same time conserve foreign exchange, the construction of local enterprises was to be implemented on a wide scale. In recent months the North Korean Central News Agency has disclosed that the construction of local iron and steel plants is being carried out. (U)

(1) What is the anticipated production from the local plants? What is the quality of the output? (C)

(2) How is the responsibility for administering and financing of the local plants divided among the Central, Provincial and County authorities? (C)

(3) Has Communist China aided North Korea in the development of the local plant program with plans, equipment or technical personnel? (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959-31 January 1960)

NORTH VIETNAM

A/ Political

North Vietnam's failure to obtain unification elections in July 1956 and the indefinite postponement of a new Geneva conference have apparently frustrated Hanoi's short range attempts to unify Vietnam, although the goal of an all-Communist Vietnam remains. Any information on North Vietnam's efforts to achieve unification through possible military action, subversion, economic warfare, or negotiation remains an important intelligence target. (C)

1. What is the nature and extent of Communist infiltration and subversive tactics: (C)

a. In South Vietnam? (C)

b. In Laos? How much control does Hanoi exert over the NLHZ? (C)

c. In Cambodia? (C)

2. What are the leading Lao Dong Party and DRV government offices and personnel in North Vietnam concerned with subversion activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia? (C)

3. How much success is the regime having in subverting tribal elements in central Vietnam? (C)

a. How effective are the native language broadcasts which Hanoi beams to the montagnards? (C)

4. Among Hanoi's leaders whose stature appears to be rising and whose falling? (C)

a. What is the relative stature of Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Pham Hung, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Vo Nguyen Giap. Are there any dark horses? (C)

b. Does Ho Chi Minh still have a firm grasp on the party and government apparatus? Any information on the state of his health? (C)

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NORTH VIETNAM (Continued)

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October 1959-January 1960

A. Political (Continued)

5. Information on: (C)

a. Any reorganization of the party or government hierarchy and the development of factions in the DRV or Lao Dong party leadership. Is there any indication of a split in the leadership between civilian and military elements as based on who worked in the North and who in the South during the war years? (C)

b. Lao Dong Party or DRV government policy. Evidence of the party's attitude toward international Communism, Titoism, revisionism and Chinese modifications of Marxist theory. (C)

c. Indications that the Lao Dong Party intends to convoke an all-party congress. Proceedings of such a congress including information on membership in such bodies as the Central Committee, Politburo and other central organs. (C)

d. Number of party members and procedures for joining the party, particularly information on numbers currently being recruited by the party. Is this being done on a regular basis? (C)

6. First hand information on: (C)

a. The functioning of any North Vietnamese Government services. The powers and duties of the Scientific Research Board is of particular interest. (C)

b. New provincial boundaries and streamlining of internal administration. What effect will the abolition of interzones have on government administration? (C)

c. Any evidence of dissidence or resistance to the Hanoi regime? How are the intellectuals faring under the Communist regime? (C)

d. In particular, is there a possibility of serious dissidence occurring among teachers and journalists? (C)

7. To what extent have local leaders penetrated the Buddhist and Roman Catholic clergy? (C)

8. How are the peasants reacting to pressure to join cooperatives? (C)

9. Information on the implementation and implications of the conscription program.

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NORTH VIETNAM (Continued)

Far East PRL  
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B. Foreign Affairs

1. What is the nature and extent of aid to North Vietnam from the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries? Any available data or estimates of quantities of military equipment being sent to North Vietnam from the Bloc? (C)
2. What is the extent of Chinese Communist and Soviet influence on Hanoi's affairs? (C)
3. What are North Vietnamese intentions toward Laos? (C)
  - a. To what extent have they cadred the insurgent movement in northern Laos? (C)
  - b. Is there any concrete evidence that DRV regulars were employed? (C)
  - c. Was the decision to take a stand on Laos unanimously arrived at by the leadership, or was there dissension over the issue in top party ranks? (C)
  - d. What are the minimum terms on which the Communists would settle the Laotian issue? (C)
4. Is there any possibility of formal diplomatic relations with Cambodia? (C)
5. Any information on the development of diplomatic and economic contacts with non-Orbit countries? (C)
6. What is the attitude of the regime toward the International Control Commission? Particularly in regard to Laos? (C)
7. What is the attitude of the regime towards the Overseas Vietnamese in Thailand, Cambodia and New Caledonia? How do the Vietnamese in Thailand view repatriation to NVN? What activities are the DRV representatives in Bangkok taking part in? (C)

C. Military

1. Organization of the Defense Ministry. (C)
2. Nature of Chinese Communist military assistance with respect to continuing logistics support. (C)
3. Number and position of ChiCom military personnel in North Vietnamese armed forces. (C)

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NORTH VIETNAM (Continued)

Far East PRL

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October-1959-January 1960

C. Military (Continued)

4. Morale of North Vietnamese troops. (C)
5. Relation of Political officer to Commanding officer. (C)
6. Introduction of new types of weapons and equipment. (C)
7. Any information pertaining to newly organized Air Force, but specifically type of training, location of training sites, types of equipment, and organizational structure. (C)
8. Any information pertaining to North Vietnamese Navy. Its organization, personnel strength, training, mission, equipment, etc. (C)
9. Personnel shifts in the high command with appropriate biographic information where available. (C)
10. Degree of Soviet influence in NV armed forces and attitude of North Vietnamese to Soviets. (C)
11. Any information of military production including the manufacture of arms, ammunition, and military equipment. (C)
12. Battle tactics of all components. (C)
13. Strategic role of North Vietnamese armed forces as envisaged by NV high command. (C)

D. Economic

1. Agriculture

a. During the first six months of 1959 the speed-up in agricultural socialization resulted in an increase of from 4 per cent to almost 20 per cent in the number of peasant families organized into cooperatives of at least an elementary form. The Three Year Plan (1958-60) requires that by the end of 1960 all peasants be organized into cooperatives; the pace of the program, therefore, will have to be accelerated if this goal is to be met. It is felt that any such speed-up in socialization would be resented by the peasantry and would be met with at least some passive resistance. (U)

(1) What pressures are being used to induce middle-class peasants to join collectives and how effective are they? (U)

S E C R E T

NORTH VIETNAM (Continued)

Far East PRL

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October 1959-January 1960

D. Economic (Continued)

1. Agriculture (Continued)

a. (2) How successful have middle-class peasants been in resisting pressures to join collectives? What portion of the peasant population belong to the middle-class? What proportion of the total farm land is in the hands of: (a) Poor (formerly landless peasants) peasants, (b) small peasants, (c) middle-peasants, (d) rich peasants, and (e) landlord? (U) These are the five categories of landowners in North Vietnam.

(3) What are the prospects of a full-scale collectivization campaign in late 1959 or early 1960? Which class(es) of peasants would be affected most economically by such a campaign? (U)

(4) How reliable are Communist claims that per unit production of agricultural commodities on Agricultural Production Cooperatives and higher type collectives is larger than on independent farms? (U)

b. Communist regime propaganda has been replete with claims of a higher level of food consumption, self-sufficiency in agricultural production, increased exports of agricultural commodities, and substantial increases in the yields of almost all crops. (U)

(1) How does the level of food consumption in 1959 in rural and urban areas compare with that in 1958? (Quantitative comparisons if possible) (U)

(2) How does the volume of government-procured food commodities in 1958/59 compare with that in the previous year? (U)

(3) What evidences--quantitatively--are there of increased exports and less imports of agricultural commodities in 1958/59 and 1959/60 compared with 1957/58 and earlier years? (U)

(4) What evidences exist--other than official claims--that yield and production of crops, especially rice, in 1959, exceeded those in previous years? (U)

(5) How effective has the irrigation system been in providing adequate water for crops during the dry season--spring and early summer--and in minimizing flood damage in the wet season--late summer and autumn? (U)

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S E C R E T

NORTH VIETNAM (Continued)

Far East PRL

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October 1959-January 1960

D. Economic (Continued)

1. Agriculture (Continued)

c. Although the regime has generally stated that it does not intend to institute Chinese-style communes now, a recent Hanoi press report (as yet unverified) states that a commune-type establishment has been organized at Xuan Quan in the Red River Delta for the workers of the Bac Hung Hai irrigation project. We would like verification of this report, as well as any other information on similar schemes to establish communes. (U)

2. Trade

a. We particularly need information on the level of and commodity breakdown of North Vietnam's imports and exports, as well as on how the DRV's chronic deficit in the balance-of-payments with other Bloc countries is being financed. Is there any evidence to support a hypothesis that this deficit is carried, on a continuing basis, on the books of other Bloc nations? Have any of the long-term credits extended by the bloc countries been used to cover this deficit? (U)

3. Transportation

a. There have been recent reports indicating that the Hanoi--P'ing-hsiang railway is to be converted from meter (3' 3 3/8") gauge to standard Chinese (4' 8 1/2") gauge. (S)

(1) Is the work now actually in progress? (S)

(2) Has conversion been planned or begun on the Hanoi--Lao Kay line? (S)

4. Telecommunications

a. Currently, there are no microwave radio relay facilities in North Vietnam. Information is requested on the the possible construction of such facilities. (S)

5. Zinc

a. The zinc smelter at Quang Yen (20-56N; 106-48E) was severely damaged during World War II, and we have received no conclusive reports that it has been rehabilitated. However, there have been recent indications that the first attempts at rehabilitation may now be in progress. Is there any current activity at the plant? (U)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959-31 January 1960)

PHILIPPINES

A. Political - Internal

1. Information is requested on popular reaction to the Garcia administration, key figures and advisers to the President, prospects for government integrity and efficiency as a result of the various investigations now underway, the operation of the PCAFE, proposals to establish an anti-graft court, and extent of submission to political and economic (special interest) pressures. (C)

a. Factions in ruling Nacionalista Party and identification of any strong opposition or challenge to President Garcia. Possible opposition to Garcia from the armed forces. (C)

b. Plans or moves of Garcia to counteract such opposition; any indication of a plan by Garcia to make the armed forces his personal instrument of power. (C)

2. Candidates, maneuvers and prospects in November 1959 senatorial and local elections. (C)

a. Any indications of a revival of an opposition coalition between Liberals and Progressive or Liberals and grand Alliance. (C)

b. Indications of irregularities or violence in conduct of the elections. (C)

3. Role of opposition Vice President Macapagal in Nacionalista administration, as well as his role in Liberal party planning activities and hierarchy. Attempts of various factions within the Liberal Party to gain control. (C)

4. General character and capability of Congress. Extent of coordination or conflict between the executives and legislative branches. (C)

5. Influence on the administration of pressure groups or special interest groups, such as the sugar bloc, the Catholic Church, etc. (C)

6. Role of Philippine public opinion; influence of press, radio, periodic publications, etc. (U)

PHILIPPINES (Continued)

Far East PRL  
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A. Political - Internal (Cont'd) Oct. 1959-January 1960

7. Trends and variants in Philippine nationalism. Significant manifestations of nationalist sentiment in politics, commerce, education, and religion. (C)

8. Political developments in the provinces. Provincial attitudes toward the central government. Differences in attitude toward the central government. Differences in attitude between the urban and rural populace. Activities of opposition parties in key provinces affecting national political strengths. (C)

9. Events reflecting religious influence in politics. Developments in the controversy over separation of church and state. Recto's influence on Protestant minority groups in view of his stand in favor of separation of church and state. (U)

10. Political orientation of minority groups. Developments in the integration of these groups into Philippine national life. (C)

11. Characteristics and attitudes of the various socio-economic groups in Philippine society. (U)

12. Development of chauvinism, neutralism or other extremist ideas directed against the Western anti-Communist alliance. Development of support for the idea of "positive nationalism"--i.e., the idea of channeling patriotic energies into the activities of building and improving the nation rather than into chauvinism, xenophobia, "Asian neutralism", etc. Activities of National Progress Movement (KMB) or other nationalist organizations (PLECNA, LYSEREE, etc.). (C)

B. Communism

1. Communist Party policy, strategy, and tactics (Party line); Party education and propaganda. (S)

2. Party structure and leadership; finance; communications, including in particular contacts with foreign Communist parties or groups. (S)

3. Party membership; strength, composition, capabilities. (S)

4. Party front organizations and infiltration, including:

a. HMB (Huk) and military activities. (S)

b. Students and youth; peasants; workers. (S)



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PHILIPPINES (Continued)

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B. Communism (Continued)

4. c. Middle-upper class intelligentsia, including especially NCP and other chauvinist nationalist groups such as KMB; tie-in with Cipriano Cid and certain other labor leaders or with KMP. (S)

d. Effect of Supreme Court decisions granting bail to imprisoned Communists. Activities of released prisoners, if any. (C)

5. Communist espionage and intelligence. (S)

6. Chinese component of the Communist Party: policies, activities, and membership; relations with Filipino Communists and with the Communist Party of China. (S)

7. Government anti-Communist measures. In particular legal prosecution of Communist leaders; status of prominent Communists under government indictment, effectiveness of 1957 anti-subversion law and of government agencies.

8. Extent of influence of USSR activities or international Communist line on CPP propaganda or tactics. (S)

9. What evidence is there that religion per se acts as an obstacle to the spread of Communism or, on the other hand, that it acts as a vehicle for the spread of Communism? (C)

10. Communist offers of economic assistance and possible Philippine interest. (C)

C. Foreign Relations

1. Attitudes toward US, including: (C)

a. Reaction to US attitude toward Garcia administration. (C)

b. Reaction to US foreign policy in the Far East. (C)

c. Bases rights and operations. (C)

d. Criticism of US-Philippine defense and trade arrangements, economic assistance, implementation of agreed credits, etc., which could weaken Philippine orientation toward US. (C)

2. Alien activities among minority groups. (C)

PHILIPPINES (Continued)

Far East PRL  
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B. Communism (Continued)

3. Interest in, or support for, neutralist policies of other Asian countries. Attitude toward SEATO, Asian-African cooperation, including extent of cooperation or disillusionment with either. (S)

4. General relations with other Southeast Asian or Asian countries in political, economic, cultural, military field. Interest in SEA regional cooperation. (C)

5. Desire for trade with, economic aid from, or cultural contacts with, Sino-Soviet Bloc. Any indications of Philippine or Soviet-initiated moves in this direction. Any trips to orbit by Filipinos or attempts to contact Bloc officials in other countries. (S)

6. Nature of implementation of Japanese reparations including any signs of disagreement, discontent, malversation in handling reparations. Japanese activities in Philippine business. (C)

7. Attitude of Garcia administration toward foreign investment and foreign assistance in economic development. (C)

a. Indications of capital flight by Filipino or alien business. (C)

b. Prospects for more legislation discriminating against foreign investors. (C)

D. Economic

1. Effect of Garcia "austerity measure" to stop drain on exchange reserves. Other plans such as possible changes in credit policy, peso devaluation, foreign exchange tax, etc. Evidence of intentions to seek foreign loans. (C)

a. Use of loans or credits made available by US. (C)

2. Outlook for progress in such areas as land and tenure reform and resettlement, government revenue and expenditures, agricultural production, industrialization, unemployment. (U)

a. Attitudes of congressmen, businessmen and government officials toward these programs; attempts to block reform or take measures toward the benefit of special interest. (C)

b. Capacity of Philippine economy to sustain economic development programs. Economic proposals and attitudes of key officials and members of the National Economic Council, or prominent businessmen. (C)

PHILIPPINES (Continued)

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D. Economic (Continued)

2. c. Indications of economic decline, such as deterioration of major export industries, prices, inflationary symptoms, business pessimism, and increase in unemployment. (U)

3. Analysis of economic difficulties created by need for industrialization. Forecasts of results of production from industries established to date on dollar expenditures for imports on domestic price levels. (C)

4. Reports of smuggling, illegal barter, etc. (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

SOUTH KOREA

A. Political - Internal

1. Government and popular attitudes toward unification, government policy, President Rhee, the Liberal Party, corruption in government, Cho Pyong-ok and Chang Myon. (C)

2. Upon which individuals does President Rhee rely most heavily in formulating specific policies? To what degree are Madame Rhee or members of the presidential secretariate successful in withholding information from President Rhee? On what subjects is information likely to be withheld? Information is needed on the role of Madame Rhee and the secretariat in determining government policy. What are the ambitions of the new Home Minister Ch'oe In-yu? What are the chances of his realization of these ambitions? How influential is he in Liberal Party and government circles? (C)

3. Continuing information is desired on the state of health of President Rhee, Vice President Chang Myon, Assembly speaker Yi Ki-pung, and Democratic Party co-leader Cho Pyong-ok. (U)

4. The National Police have been one of President Rhee's primary instruments of control and have worked closely with the Liberal Party. Are there any indications that the police may be wavering in their support of the administration? Are there any indications that, though supporting the administration, the police may be attempting to hedge their position by developing friendly contacts with opposition leaders? (S)

5. Continuing information is needed on the political status of Liberal Party chief Yi Ki-pung; Liberal intraparty factional strife. How firm is Yi's position as Rhee's chief political lieutenant? Who are his main protagonists? Who would be likely to replace Yi if he were forced to step down as chief of the Liberal Party and be replaced as Rhee's chief lieutenant? (S)

6. Information is needed on the political plans and activities of Ho Chong, former mayor of Seoul and one-time assistant to President Rhee? Are there any indications that Ho is being used by Yi Ki-pung to negotiate a Liberal-Democratic merger? What would be the purpose of such a merger? Under what circumstances would such a merger likely occur? What would be its effect on the ROK political scene? (S)

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SOUTH KOREA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

7. Continuing information is needed on the status of Democratic Party factionalism, maneuvering for the 1960 presidential nomination. Is the Cho Pyong-ok faction receptive to overtures to join the Liberal Party? Information is needed on the relationship between the Cho group and the Liberal Party. (S)

8. Continuing information is needed on Liberal and Democratic plans and attitudes towards establishing a parliamentary type of government, abolishing or changing the vice presidency. Could the Liberals agree on any such constitutional amendment that President Rhee would agree to? Would the Democrats be likely to support such an amendment? (S)

9. Continuing information is needed on administration plans to repress the opposition Democratic Party, Democratic plans to resist such government pressure, indications of possible civil violence and rioting. What are Rhee's and the Liberal Party's plans and intentions for retaining power in the face of waning popular support? To what extent is the administration willing to resort to police and strong-arm tactics to retain power, particularly in regard to the 1960 elections? Are any further suspensions of opposition and/or independent newspapers contemplated? Which ones? Further information is needed on the role the army might play in the struggle for power. (C)

10. Continuing information is needed on Democratic election plans for 1960. How strong is popular support for the Democrats, in rural areas, in urban areas? What changes in ROK attitudes toward the US, Japan, and North Korea would take place if the Democrats won the presidency? (C)

11. Information is needed on the political status of Yi Pom-sok, possible intentions of staging a political comeback, his relationship to Won Yong-tok. (C)

12. In the wake of the administration's suppression of the leftist Progressive Party last year, and the recent execution of party leader Cho Pong-am, what effect has the administration's action had on other leftist factions? (We need detailed information on leftist groupings and factions, as well as other minor political parties and groups, secondary leaders likely to achieve increasing importance, and biographic information on leftists.) (C)

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SOUTH KOREA (Continued)

A. Political - Internal (Continued)

13. Information is needed on the political orientation of South Korean students and intelligentsia, student support of the opposition Democratic Party, student leftist sentiment. What are student attitudes toward the United States, Korean unification, Japan? Has there been any Communist penetration of student circles? If so, to what extent? (C)

14. Is there any Communist penetration of the ROK Government? Of the Liberal Party or its affiliated organizations? Of the Democratic Party? (Indications of shifts in NK targeting agent-types, and approaches plus indications of increasing vulnerabilities on the part of the ROK populace are desired). (S)

15. Does the general populace consider, on the basis of knowledge available to them that they are better off economically, politically, educationally, etc., than the North Koreans? Does the general populace still harbor feelings of hatred toward Communist Koreans? (C)

16. Information is desired concerning the political affiliations and attitudes of military leaders, their reactions to the National Security Law, and the possibility that they may intervene if political instability follows Rhee's death or if there is a threat of public disorder. (S)

17. Continuing information is desired concerning public reaction to the National Security and Local Autonomy Laws and to the way in which they may be utilized by the Rhee Government for political purposes. (S)

18. To what extent do South Koreans listen to North Korean broadcasts? (C)

B. Military

The possibility of truce violations by South Korea, including a renewal of hostilities, continues as a major intelligence target. (S)

1. To what extent is the ROK attempting to promote tension by provoking incidents in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or along the North Korean coast? (S)

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SOUTH KOREA (Continued)

B. Military (Continued)

2. What senior military leaders would actually carry out a "march north" order by President Rhee? Which could be counted upon to warn American officials of such action and to block execution of such orders? (S)

3. How firm is ROK Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-chan's control of the army? Which of his subordinates oppose him; what opposition has he outside the Army? If there is a high command shake-up, what effect is it likely to have and who will probably replace the current military chiefs? To what extent is General Song a political general? How valid are reports that General Song is 'politically naive' and can be counted upon to deliver the military vote for President Rhee in the 1960 election? To what extent will such political activity detract from the military effectiveness of General Song and the ROK Army? Report on the activities of General Paik Sun-yup. (S)

4. Information is desired on any ROK military negotiations with Nationalist China or South Vietnam. Do war plans for a "march north" call for coordinated attacks by ROK and Nationalist forces? What military agreements exist between South Korea and Nationalist China? What action, if any, would President Rhee be likely to take should the Chinese Communists invade the Nationalist offshore islands; attacks Taiwan? In such a situation would Rhee be likely to order a march north? (S)

5. What is the status of morale in the South Korean Army? How does the combat effectiveness of the South Korean Army compare with that of Communist forces to the north? Has corruption and political factionalism lowered the combat capability of the armed forces? (S)

6. Reactions in ROK army, as well as government and among individuals, on possible reductions in ROK force levels. (S)

C. Foreign Affairs

1. What is the popular attitude toward unification? In the campaign for the 1958 assembly elections the Democrats opposed Korean unification through unilateral ROK military action and supported UN supervised elections in both North and South Korea. What effect has this had on popular attitudes toward unification? Is there any indication that Rhee might reverse his position and agree to UN supervised elections in South Korea? Are there any indications of public acceptance of reunification based on the neutralism of the Korean Peninsula? (U)



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SOUTH KOREA (Continued)

C. Foreign Affairs (Continued)

2. Continuing information is needed on the status of ROK-Japanese relations and the attitudes of responsible Korean officials toward Japan. 25X6A  
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In particular: new ROK intentions regarding claims, reactions to a liberal Japanese fisheries convention, ROK arguments that Japan has already, in effect, recognized the Rhee line, reaction to and possible plans to block the repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea. (S)
3. What are the attitudes of specific Democratic leaders toward Japan? What steps might Chang Myon take toward improving relations with Japan should he be elevated to the presidency? What is the general public's attitude toward Japan; also that of students and intellectuals? To what extent is anti-Japanese feeling rooted in the Korean people and to what extent is it governmentally inspired? (U)
4. What is likely to be South Korea's future role in the Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APAXL)? In any regional alliance? Is there any indication that President Rhee desires closer relations with Nationalist China or other anti-Communist Asian states? ROK plans to promote an East Asian security system. (C)
5. Has US military or economic aid generated any hard feelings toward the US as it has in some other countries? (C)
6. Continuing information is needed on the status of the government's plans to secure a status-of-forces agreement. (C)

D. Economic

1. A cross-section of Korean opinion--from officials, businessmen, and intellectuals to the man in the street--concerning economic developments and difficulties in South Korea are extremely useful in gauging general confidence in the future of the country and the economy. We are particularly interested in opinions and analyses concerning the effectiveness of U.S. aid, the role of the Korean government, the opportunities and prospects for private long-term investment, suggestions for improvement in these areas, and expectations concerning the longevity of the U.S. aid program. (U)
2. What conditions do South Korean businessmen believe are necessary to create a favorable climate for private foreign and domestic investment in productive enterprise? (U)

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SOUTH KOREA (Continued)

D. Economic

3. What steps, if any, are being taken by the ROK Government to promote an export trade? What is the present rice export potential? How does the ROK plan to purchase rice for export? (C)

4. What is the magnitude of crop disease in South Korea? How seriously does it affect agricultural production? What measures are being taken by the South Korean Government and farmers to cope with it? (U)

5. How does the fertilizer program operate from the viewpoint of the individual farmer. From whom does he purchase his fertilizer? Is it available from one or more sources? At what prices? How much is available at the government price? Is it available in time? If not in time, why not? Is there a tendency on the part of farmers to dispense with or limit their use of chemical fertilizers? If so, why? (U)

6. Do any Koreans have sizable funds invested or deposited abroad? Who? How much? Under what names? How are funds channeled in and out of these accounts? Government salaries still are not sufficient to provide a living wage. We are interested, consequently, in the methods whereby such salaries are supplemented. Representative samples are desired. What is the nature of official corruption? What is the estimated magnitude of aid funds and supplies lost through corruption or incompetence? Please provide examples of such loss. (C)

7. What is the current volume of dollar and MPC black marketing? What is the government's attitude toward it? For what purposes are these dollars used? Is there evidence of a drain of dollar currency from South Korea through black market operations? (C)

8. Various reports have referred to the considerable below-capacity operation of certain key industrial and mining facilities, as well as the shutdown of certain US-UN aid-financed industrial plants. What are the reasons for this? Do these plants have sufficient operating funds to finance day-to-day activities? Has the ROK Government displayed any concern with these developments? Are Korean technological skills sufficient any are they used properly? (C)

9. What are the production figures for plants constructed with aid funds? Are the products and services being marketed? At what prices? If not, why? Are these plants reducing South Korean import costs? What is the comparative cost to the consumer of imported

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SOUTH KOREA (Continued)

D. Economic (Continued)

10. (Continued)

commodities and domestically-produced goods in the same line? Is the quality of domestically-produced goods suitable to South Korean consumer demand? How will the ROKG dispose of high-cost and less desirable fertilizer from the Chungju plant in competition with cheap and highly prized imported ammonium sulfate? (U)

11. Unconfirmed reports have referred to large-scale illegal trade between North and South Korea. What is the volume of such trade? What goods are exchanged? How? Is there any evidence that US aid goods, military supplies, or currency are being shipped to North Korea? Is any of the above information available concerning illegal trade between Japan and South Korea? Are any figures available on the amount of rice smuggled to Japan? (S)

12. How has the suspension of trade with Japan affected the South Korean economy? Industrial production, trading firms, interest rates, employment, etc.? (U)

13. The suspension also has aggravated an already deteriorating price situation in South Korea. What are the basic factors behind the price rise? Is the ROK Government prepared to devalue the official hwan if such becomes necessary under the terms of the August 1955 agreement? What direction can the price level realistically be expected to take during the next year? Why? How far? (C)

14. There are reports that a concentration of business interests in the hands of a few individuals is taking place in South Korea. To what extent are the reports true? Number of individual or corporations involved? Does this trend affect US aid projects? What are the political and economic implications? (C)

15. Is ROK engaged in organized campaign against private foreign businessmen? (C)

16. What is the significance of recent reports concerning greater independence of the labor movement and its more active role in protecting the rights of workers in such matters as non-payment of wages due? (C)

18. Which aid-financed commodities or supplies still offer a lucrative field for the Korean speculator? Why? Examples? (C)

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SOUTH KOREA (Continued)

D. Economic (Continued)

19. What are the reasons for the tardy rehabilitation of the South Korean fishing industry?

20. What is impact of ICA Community Development Program in Korea? Is it leading to improved intra- and inter-community integration? What is the attitude of the communities involved? Is any improvement in labor productivity or in standards of living apparent yet? (U)

21. To what extent is there real economic distress in the ROK, e.g., Ullong-do, and what is its political significance? (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Political - Military

1. Internal security continues to preoccupy the Diem government, which fears that the present pattern of sporadic terrorist activity in the provinces may be a prelude to widespread Communist violence. Accordingly, information bearing on the security situation in Vietnam is a priority target, including the following aspects:

a. Strength, organization, activities and intentions of the Vietnamese Communist military and political underground. Any indication of Communist plans to initiate anti-American violence or to foment anti-American sentiment among the masses. (S)

b. Strength and activities of remnant sect forces and other anti-Diem elements in South Vietnam, such as the Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, and Cao Dai. Evidence of collusion with the local Communist underground or with anti-Diem elements in Cambodia. (C)

c. Special efforts by the government to counter rural insecurity, such as mobile tribunals, etc. (C)

2. On a long-range basis, Communist infiltration and subversion presents a serious threat to stability in South Vietnam. Information is desired on Communist activities along this line; degree of success in penetrating the government, military and labor forces; efforts to enlist the support of the masses against the central government; and extent and nature of reinforcement, supply, and border crossings from Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. (C)

3. Developments connected with the scheduled holding of national assembly elections in September, including government efforts to repress opposition political elements, and possible obstructionist attempts by the Communist underground. (C)

4. Current data on the organization, membership and activities of pro-Diem political groups. Of particular interest is the Can Lao party's covert efforts to ensure tighter political discipline throughout the government. Information on factionalism within the pro-Diem groups, and on the working relationship between Ngo Dinh Can. (C)

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SOUTH VIETNAM (Continued)

A. Political - Military (Continued)

5. Criticism by government officials of Diem's leadership. The extent and trend of Diem's popularity among the intellectual, urban and rural groups. What is the extent of the central government's popular support and effectiveness in the various regions of South Vietnam? (C)
6. Composition and activities of anti-Diem parties, groups and factions in South Vietnam and abroad. (C)
7. Government efforts to control public information, and repercussions in the nation's press. Indications of neutralist or pro-North Vietnamese sentiment in the press. (C)
8. Information dealing with the minority problem in the high plateau region, including government efforts to improve relations with the Montagnard tribal groups and Communist exploitation of their grievances. (C)
9. Political attitudes and activities of the Overseas Chinese community. Extent of Chinese Nationalist influence and Chinese Communist subversion among this group. (C)
10. Development of the Vietnamese armed forces and the implementation of the government's conscription program. Any indication of dissatisfaction among the military with the present government or with political interference. (C)
11. Developments in the government's intentions and efforts to increase the effectiveness of the paramilitary Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Information is desired on the current organization and activities of these organizations, and of police and special intelligence bodies. (C)

B. Foreign Affairs

1. Any changes in the government's policy toward the reunification issue; indications of willingness to engage in limited political or economic contacts with the North Vietnamese authorities, such as a conference on mutual problems in the Demilitarized Zone. (C)
2. Vietnamese official and popular attitudes toward US aid and policy. (C)

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SOUTH VIETNAM (Continued)

B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)

3. South Vietnam's efforts, either overt or covert, to combat pro-Communist or neutralist sentiment in neighboring Cambodia and Laos. (S)

4. Saigon's psychological warfare plans and propaganda efforts aimed at weakening Communist control in North Vietnam. (C)

5. Activities of the Vietnam International Control Commission and developments in Vietnam's relationship with this body. (C)

6. Developments in Vietnamese-French political, military, economic, and cultural relations. (C)

7. Information on the expansion of South Vietnamese political and economic contacts with other nations, including the Afro-Asian countries and with international organizations, such as SEATO and the UN. (C)

C. Economic

1. Developments in Vietnam's efforts to increase agricultural production and exports and to reduce imports of manufactures. (C)

2. Information on the land development and resettlement programs, particularly in the high plateau region. (C)

3. Information on the effectiveness of the recently created Farmers' Associations as a means of increasing security and production. (C)

4. Information on Vietnam's efforts to develop limited industry; also on non-US foreign assistance in this field, such as French, Chinese Nationalist, and Japanese. (C)

5. Progress toward reconstructing Vietnam's highway and railroad facilities, and information on the new road building program in the high plateau region. (C)

D. Scientific

1. Development of an atomic energy program centered at Dalat. (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)

THAILAND

A. Political - Internal

Marshal Sarit, his health apparently at least temporarily stabilized, is extremely active in directing his personal attention to virtually every facet of government administration. At the same time, however, grumbling within the ruling military group over Sarit's alleged failure to consult it on policy matters or to take its interest adequately into consideration is increasing. The attitudes of Sarit's military supporters, particularly any firm indications of an intent to oust him, will be an important intelligence target during the next four months. Also of continuing interest are Sarit's plans in his campaign to revitalize the government administrative structure, promote economic development, and limit domestic communism. The impact of the Laotian crisis, the Sino-Indian frontier dispute, and the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchanges on the degree of resolution of Thailand's anti-Sino-Soviet bloc posture will also be of great interest.

1. Factionalism within ruling clique: Relationships between Sarit's followers in the coup group will be of vital intelligence interest. In particular, what is the status of relations between Thanom and Prapat? Is there any evidence that they have quietly worked out a modus vivendi which would permit them to share power as successors to Sarit? What other leaders might challenge their positions? In particular, what chances have the Punnakan brothers to achieve power? (C)

2. Popular attitudes toward Ruling Clique: Reactions to the military's overthrow of the constitution. Any indications that opposition politicians, most of whom are now stripped of assembly status, may try to incite the populace, particularly students, into overt protest against the authoritarian regime. (C)

3. The Monarchy: Relations between the King and leading members of military group. Any evidence that the royal family is secretly egging on potentially disaffected elements in the military to overthrow Sarit? (C)

4. Corruption: Any evidence that Sarit is seriously following through on his stated intention to reduce corruption. Effect on intra-coup group politics of any Sarit moves to reduce corruption, or at least to centralize graft to a greater degree. (C)

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THAILAND (Continued)

A. Political - Internal. (Continued)

5. Communism: Strength and degree of effectiveness as well as the extent and source of its funds. Evidence of success in rural areas. Extent of penetration of the press, government and inner circles of ruling clique. Evidence of contact with Pridi in China or with his supporters in Thailand. Relations between suspected Chinese Communist merchants and members of government. Effect on Communist capabilities of "anti-Communist" crackdown following 20 October 1958 "coup." (C)

6. "Free Thai" Group: Strength and effectiveness. Contacts with Pridi. Extent of support for Pridi among government civil servants. Evidence of moves by ruling clique to propitiate Pridi groups. Any indications of imminent return of Pridi? If he returned, what role would the government permit him to play? Extent to which Pridi is an indoctrinated Communist and degree to which he would act as instrument of Chinese Communist policy if permitted to come home. If he is not permitted to return to Thailand, will Pridi seek to leave Communist China for a third country? If so, will the Communist Chinese permit him to depart? (C)

7. Phibun and Phao: Activities and fate of Phibun and Phao supporters. Ruling group attitudes toward each. Evidence that the return of either is imminent. (C)

8. Vietnamese Refugees: Extent of Viet Minh influence. Reaction to South Vietnam's efforts to "reorient" them. Information on implementation of recently concluded repatriation agreement with North Vietnam. (C)

9. Chinese Community: General attitudes toward Peiping and Taipei. Extent of GRC Embassy and Chinese Communist success in propagandizing the Chinese in Thailand. Attitude of the regime toward the Chinese and the latter's attitude toward the regime. (U)

10. Chinese Communist Terrorists from Malaya: Extent to which they use South Thailand as a base. Relations between the terrorists and provincial Thai officials and between terrorists and local Chinese. (U)

11. Malay Minority: Status of irredentist movement. Evidence of efforts by Federation Consul General in Songkhla to subvert Malays. Effect on Malays of increasing Communist propaganda effort in area. Government policy toward four southern provinces and its effect on the minority. (S)

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THAILAND (Continued)

B. Foreign Relations

1. Important intelligence targets during the next four months will be the impact on the Thai Government of the Tibetan revolt, other manifestations of a more bellicose posture on the part of Communists and developments in Cambodia, Laos and Burma. (C)

2. What forces are there, both inside and outside the government, which might tend to impel it toward neutralism? (C)

3. Are there any indications of an intent to cease, decelerate, or accelerate unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communists? (C)

4. Evidence of clandestine support for dissident elements in Laos and Cambodia. (S)

5. Current relations between Thailand and Cambodia. Extent of anti-Cambodian feeling among Thai government leaders and the public. (C)

6. What is the status of Thai efforts to develop regionalism in Southeast Asia? What are the Thai motives? What is the reaction of the other Southeast Asian countries? (C)

7. Attitude of the regime toward newly independent Malaya. (OUO)

8. Thai reaction to activities of army regime in Burma. (C)

9. Evidence of clandestine Thai support for Chinese bandits and opium smugglers in the Burma, Thai, Lao sector. (C)

10. Evidence of covert involvement in Shan dissident movement. (C)

C. Economic

1. Any adverse economic trends which might affect the political situation? (C)

2. Development plans and attitudes toward American aid. (C)

3. Any plans for a resumption of trade with Communist China? (C)

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THAILAND (Continued)

C. Economic (Continued)

4. Rice export prospects. (C)
5. Progress in attracting foreign investment. (U)

D. Soviet Bloc Medical Assistance

1. Have other Soviet or Satellite contributions or medical aid been presented to Thailand recently? (C)
2. How is Soviet or Satellite medical aid propagandized? How effective is the propaganda? (C)
3. What Soviet or Satellite medical personnel have been in Thailand recently? (C)
4. What Thai medical personnel have recently visited the USSR or Satellites? (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

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TIBET

A. Political - Military

The Tibet scene has changed radically as a result of the revolution. We are interested in all aspects of the revolt and its aftermath, especially Peiping's new policy for Tibet. (C)

1. The revolt. (C)
  - a. Extend of Chinese control following the revolt. (C)
  - b. Size, disposition and capabilities of remnant guerrilla forces. (C)
  - c. Attitude of Tibetans toward the revolt and the rebels. (C)
2. China's new policy for Tibet. (C)
  - a. Details of "peaceful" revolution Peiping is pushing in Tibet. (C)
  - b. Peasant attitude toward reforms. (C)
  - c. Communist treatment of religious institutions in Tibet. (C)
  - d. Introduction of settlers from China proper. (C)
3. Dalai and Panchen Lamas. (C)
  - a. Chinese attitude toward exiled Dalai Lama and puppet Panchen Lama. (C)
  - b. Tibetan attitude toward Dalai Lama. (C)
  - c. Tibetan acceptance of Panchen Lama. (C)
  - d. Relationship between Panchen Lama and Chinese. (C)
4. Sino-Indian relations. (C)

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TIBET (Continued)

A. Political - Military (Continued)

- Tibet. (C)
4. a. Details of Indian attitudes and activities vis-a-vis  
b. Details of Peiping's response to Indian attitude. (C)
  5. Miscellaneous. (C)
    - a. Current Soviet activities in Tibet. (C)
    - b. Morale of Chinese forces in Tibet. (C)
    - c. Current Chinese Communist party, government and  
military organization in Tibet. (C)
    - d. Asian/African reaction to Chinese handling of Tibet  
revolt. (C)

B. Economic

1. Is the economic base of the important monasteries, particularly land holdings, likely to be affected by "democratic reforms?" (C)
2. How do the improved supply routes from China affect Tibet's economy and standard of living? (C)
3. Results of recent geological surveys, with particular reference to any discoveries of strategic natural resources. (C)

C. Scientific

Any information bearing on the London Daily Express story earlier this year concerning reported large scale construction of missile launching pads by the Soviets in Tibet? (C)

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